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Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts 
JOHN F. PREIS 
In recent years, a subtle shift in constitutional tort doctrine has quietly begun to 
take root. In Bivens actions, the Supreme Court has recently implied that 
constitutional tort plaintiffs must seek relief under state law when it is available, rather 
than invoke their federal constitutional rights. This marks a dramatic change from 
past practices. For much of the twentieth century, a central premise in the 
constitutional tort field has been that the federal remedy is "supplementary" to the 
state remedy; constitutional tort plaintiffs have therefore been permitted to seek a 
remedy under federal law without regard to the availability of state remedies. 
Underlying this premise has been the belief that state law-usually tort law-might be 
"inconsistent with, or even hostile" to federal rights, or that state courts, "by reason 
of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, " would fail to enforce state 
law. 
In this Article, I first demonstrate that these two beliefs are no longer sound or 
certain. Though I find the beliefs insupportable, I find the traditional rule remains 
justified. State remedies should be ignored, not because state tort law will be hostile to 
federal rights, ·or because state courts will be prejudiced towards litigants, but because 
state tort law-having developed over centuries to address interactions between 
private individuals--cannot reliably capture, through doctrine or theory, interactions 
between private citizens and government officials. Given this inherent nature of tort 
law, attempts to assess the availability of alternative state remedies will often be 
confounding and result in incorrect conclusions. Moreover, this problem is likely to be 
exacerbated by the sparse record available to the court at the moment these issues 
arise, which is typically during a motion to dismiss. Finally, relying on state remedies 
in constitutional tort actions is likely to have deleterious effects on state law, effects 
that are not offset by any federalist benefits. I conclude by considering whether 
certification-which would allow state courts to resolve the vexing state law 
questions-would resolve the problems identified. I find certification wanting and thus 
recommend that state remedies play no role in constitutional tort actions. 
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Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts 
JOHN F. PREIS• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under federal law, one who suffers a constitutional violation may 
typically seek damages from the responsible government official. 1 Such 
suits are known as "constitutional tort actions" because they often involve 
misbehavior-such as battery or imprisonment--commonly regulated by 
tort law. Though the law of constitutional torts has periodically borrowed 
tort principles to fill gaps in constitutionallaw,2 the actual substance of tort 
law in any particular jurisdiction has always been irrelevant to the merits of 
the constitutional tort suit. Until lately, that is. In the past couple years, 
the Supreme Court has begun to hold that, in constitutional tort actions 
against federal officers (so-called "Bivens actions"), plaintiffs may not 
avail themselves of relief under federal law if state law provides relief.3 
Thus, where the state law of battery, for example, provides the Bivens 
plaintiff with relief, he may not seek damages under the federal 
constitution. In a different line of cases, the Supreme Court has also held 
that plaintiffs suing state officers (so-called "Section 1983 actions") for 
unconstitutional takings must first advance their Fifth Amendment claims 
in state court.4 In 2005, the Court then held that federal courts must grant 
the state court decision "full faith and credit," thus effectively barring 
takings cases from being filed in federal district courts.5 Though the Court 
has not yet extended this rule to cases outside the takings context or 
' Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Vanderbilt University School 
of Law; B.S., Cornell University. Many of the ideas herein were sharpened through conversations with 
Rebecca Brown, Susan Herman, Jason Mazzone, Lou Mulligan, Tony Sebok, Suzanna Sherry, Mike 
Wells, and members of the Brooklyn Law School Junior Faculty Workshop. In addition, Keith 
Baumann provided important research assistance on short notice. 
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (permitting suits against state officers); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,389 (1971) (permitting suits against federal 
officers). 
2 See, e.g., Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. 
L. REv. 225, 231 (1986) (describing the Supreme Court's "adopti[on] [of a] common-law tort 
paradigm" in constitutional tort cases). 
3 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007) (holding that the decision whether to 
recognize a Bivens remedy first requires the courts to determine if"any alternative, existing process for 
protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing 
a new and freestanding remedy to damages"). 
4 See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 
(1985) (holding that property owners cannot claim violation of the Fifth Amendment's just taking 
clause until they seek and are denied relief in a state forum). 
5 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 337-38 (2005). 
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required reliance on state tort remedies (as it has in the Bivens cases), such 
an extension, when considered in light of related doctrine, is quite 
plausible. 
Together, these cases suggest an increasing relevance of state law in 
the field of constitutional torts. This is a marked change from past 
practice. With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and related 
legislation soon after the Civil War, the federal government assumed 
primary responsibility for the enforcement of civil rights. States were still 
free to enforce civil rights with their own law, but federal law-and thus 
federal jurisdiction-would always be available to the plaintiff. This 
system of civil rights enforcement was based on the implicit, and 
sometimes explicit, presumption that state courts were often controlled by 
"prejudice, passion, neglect, [or] intolerance.',(; Thus, state law was 
considered irrelevant since forcing a civil rights plaintiff to rely on it would 
force her into state court as well. Later, the Supreme Court offered an 
additional reason to ignore possible relief under state law: state law might 
be "inconsistent or even hostile" to federal rights. 7 Under this claim, relief 
might fail not because of prejudice, but merely because state law lacked 
the content and force to properly compensate plaintiffs. 
Whatever their original truth, these two assumptions-that state courts 
may be prejudiced and that state law may be hostile to federal rights-no 
longer ring true. State courts are hardly the bastions of prejudice they once 
were, and even though prejudice no doubt remains, the prejudice is 
contingent upon a variety of complex, ever-changing factors, factors that 
may have equal or greater force in federal court as well. Thus, 
assumptions of prejudice cannot adequately support doctrine in this field 
over the long term. Nor does the "hostility" claim fair much better. While 
it is true that state law will indeed be hostile to federal civil rights in some 
instances, a close analysis of tort suits against the government reveals that 
tort law will often provide significantly greater compensation to civil rights 
plaintiffs than civil rights law itself. In this sense, state tort law is hardly 
hostile to the civil rights plaintiff. 
Despite the weakness of these two assumptions, this Article argues that 
state remedies should remain irrelevant in the adjudication of constitutional 
tort actions. The largely neutral operation of state courts and state law 
nonetheless cannot guarantee that a plaintiff with a facially valid civil 
rights claim will obtain relief under state tort law. This is due to the 
inherent incompatibility between tort and constitutional law. While both 
legal regimes focus on similar goals (they both regulate the imposition of 
force upon another, for example), the doctrines used to achieve these goals 
differ in subtle but highly consequential ways. Thus, an unconstitutional 
6 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). 
7 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,394 (1971). 
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stop and frisk for example, may or may not give rise to the tort of battery. 
The point is not that relief will necessarily be unavailable, but that it will 
often be impossible to tell in advance. This difficulty is only heightened 
by the stage of the proceedings in which judges will be forced to make 
these decisions. Arguments alleging that the plaintiff has an alternative 
remedy under state law will typically be advanced in a motion to dismiss, 
which will be filed long before any discovery occurs. The judge must 
therefore determine, from only the face of the plaintiff's complaint (which 
will be drafted with an eye towards federal, and not state, law) whether a 
state law claim exists. This challenging inquiry will necessarily invite 
another problem, quite foreign to the field of constitutional torts, but 
common to cases within the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. When 
federal courts apply state law in novel ways (as the arguments advancing 
alternative state remedy theories will often require), there is a risk, quite 
familiar since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,8 that state law will be 
unnecessarily muddied or distorted. 
In addition to these points, I add two other criticisms of the use of state 
remedies specific to the Bivens context. The use of state remedies in 
constitutional tort actions has a federalist tinge to it; by allowing disputes 
to be resolved under state, rather than federal, law, states are granted a 
zone of autonomy to resolve disputes between their own citizens and 
government. Yet whatever the merit of this view, it has no application in 
the Bivens context. Bivens suits, as explained above, involve violations of 
federal constitutional law by federal officials and are most often 
adjudicated in federal court. As such, there are no state interests of which 
to take account in these cases. Another criticism here involves Carlson v. 
Green, a Bivens case that is indispensable to the Court's current Bivens 
jurisprudence. Carlson holds that constitutional tort actions should be 
available to litigants, regardless of whether they may also obtain relief 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 9 Yet, when a Bivens plaintiff is denied 
a cause of action and forced to rely on state tort law, the plaintiff must 
proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (which incorporates state tort 
law as the rule of decision in cases against the federal government). 10 The 
reliance on state remedies cannot stand together with Carlson. 
Having demonstrated that the use of state remedies in constitutional 
tort actions is improper, I then consider whether the practice may be 
rescued through the use of certification. Certification of state law 
questions to state courts could conceivably ameliorate the uncertainty in 
knowing whether state tort law does in fact regulate the alleged 
government misbehavior. Yet I find certification to be a cumbersome 
8 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
9 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980). 
10 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b )(I) (2000). 
728 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:723 
process, one that will likely frustrate state-federal comity more than it 
advances it. In sum, therefore, I find that the availability of state remedies 
should play no role in federal constitutional tort actions. 
II. THE NEW RELEVANCE OF ALTERNATIVE STATE REMEDIES 
A. Alternative State Remedies and Bivens 
The use of state remedies in Bivens cases, though a recent 
development, is based on doctrine that has long persisted in the field. 
Indeed, in Bivens itself, although the Court implied a damages remedy 
directly under the constitution, 11 the Court evinced some hesitancy to 
intrude into an area where Congress clearly had the authority to act. 12 In 
the end, the Court implied the remedy in part because there was no 
"affirmative action by Congress" suggesting disproval of the remedy. 13 
Thus, Bivens itself contained the seed of the state remedy rule: the 
availability of a constitutional damages action depends not simply on the 
existence of a constitutional right, but on the absence of congressional 
action in the field. 
In Carlson, the Court addressed in greater detail the nature of 
"affmnative action by Congress" that will displace a Bivens action. In 
Carlson, the estate of a federal prisoner sued a prison official for damages 
arising from an alleged Eighth Amendment violation. 14 Because the claim 
could be recast as an intentional tort, the plaintiff could have sought relief 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).15 One could reason that, in 
passing the FTCA, Congress had "affirmatively" disproved the cause of 
action Carlson was invoking. Yet, the Court held to the contrary. Such 
affirmative intent only existed where "Congress has provided an 
alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective."16 
11 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (holding that a "violation of[the Fourth Amendment] by a federal 
agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon 
his unconstitutional conduct"). 
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (creating a cause of action for damages and other relief against a 
state actor who deprives an individual of a constitutional right). 
13 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. The Court also explained that the action should not be implied if 
"special factors counsel[] hesitation." !d. For an application of this limitation on the action, see 
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (holding that a damages action by military officer 
against his superior should not be implied because "the unique disciplinary structure of the Military 
Establishment and Congress' [unique] activity in the field constitute 'special factors' which dictate that 
it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type against their superior 
officers"). The application of the "special factors" prong of the Bivens doctrine is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
14 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16. 
15 /d. at 20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l) (allowing certain tort claims against the federal 
government). 
16 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19. 
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The Court held that the FTCA failed this standard. Congress had not 
"explicitly declared [the FTCA] to be a substitute" and the FTCA was not 
"viewed as equally effective."17 Carlson is thus a second step in the 
development of the state remedy rule: it held that alternative 
remedies-which in this case, were federal in nature--can sometimes 
displace a Bivens action. 
Bush v. Lucas came next. 18 In Bush, the Court considered whether a 
Bivens action existed for First Amendment claims that "arise out of a 
[federal government] employment relationship."19 Under an act of 
Congress, disputes arising out of a federal employment relationship were 
"governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving 
meaningful remedies against the United States."20 Although the 
meaningful remedies might not "provide complete relief for the 
plaintiff,"21 the Court nonetheless held they were sufficient to displace the 
Bivens action.22 Thus, after Bush, federal alternative remedies can displace 
a Bivens action without being "equally effective"; rather, the remedies need 
only be "meaningful." 
Nearly two decades later, the Court addressed the issue again in 
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko?3 In Malesko, a federal prisoner 
brought a Bivens action against a private firm hired by the federal Bureau 
of Prisons to operate a halfway house. In declining to imply a cause of 
action for damages, the Court explained that it had "consistently rejected 
invitations to extend Bivens" except "to provide a cause of action for a 
plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy."24 Here, in the Court's 
opinion, Malesko had two alternative remedies: (1) filing a grievance using 
the Bureau of Prisons Administrative Remedy Program or (2) filing an 
action under state tort law for negligence?5 Thus, after Carlson introduced 
the concept of alternative remedies, and Bush made it clear that those 
remedies need only be meaningful, Malesko appeared to hold that state 
remedies were meaningful alternatives which could displace a Bivens 
action. 
To be sure, the Malesko opinion is not entirely clear with respect to 
whether a Bivens action may be displaced by a state remedy alone, or if 
displacement might only be accomplished by state and federal remedies 
17 /d. 
18 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
19 /d. at 368. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. at 388. 
22 /d. at 390. 
23 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
24 /d. at 70. Because the defendant in this suit was a corporation, rather than an individual, the 
Court additionally based its decision on the belief that corporate liability would not deter individual 
misbehavior. /d. at 70-71. 
25 /d. at 74. 
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acting together. Nonetheless, the statement that the constitutional damages 
action could be defeated by "any" alternative remedy-state or 
federal--certainly leaves open the possibility that the tort action alone 
would have been enough. And indeed, in the past two years, this 
interpretation has begun to catch on. In a number of cases in 2005 and 
2006, federal circuit and district courts have repeatedly held that the 
existence of a state tort remedy entirely displaces a Bivens action. 
The most prominent of these cases is Peoples v. CCA Detention 
Centers, decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2005.26 In 
Peoples, a plaintiff brought a Bivens action against a prison guard 
employed at a privately-run prison.27 After discussing the evolution of the 
Bivens doctrine, the court admitted that it was less than clear whether the 
case was controlled by Carlson or Malesko, both of which involved suits 
by prisoners against those detaining them.28 "[A]t first blush," the court 
explained, "Carlson may appear to control this case."29 In that case, the 
Supreme Court implied a cause of action for damages, even though "there 
appears to have been a state-law cause of action available [via the FTCA] 
against the private individual defendants."30 This "might indicate," the 
court explained, "that a state tort cause of action will not preclude a Bivens 
cause of action."31 
Yet the Tenth Circuit did not find Carlson directly on point. 
"Carlson," the court explained, "did not address the specific question of 
whether a potential state law cause of action against [an] individual will 
preclude an implied Bivens claim."32 Rather, Carlson only considered 
whether a FTCA action-which lies against the United States, not an 
individual-precluded a Bivens claim.33 Looking to statements in the more 
recent case of Malesko,34 the court concluded that "the sole purpose of 
26 Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090 (lOth Cir. 2005), vacated en bane, 449 F.3d 1097 
(lOth Cir. 2006). After a three judge panel issued its decision in this case, the circuit voted to re-hear 
the case en bane. The full court split evenly (6-6) on the issue and, under Tenth Circuit rules, 
reinstated the original district court opinion in the case, which held that a Bivens action could not be 
displaced by state remedies. Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 449 F.3d 1097, 1099 (lOth Cir. 2006). 
Although the Tenth Circuit's first opinion in this case was subsequently vacated, it nonetheless 
contains the most comprehensive analysis of the issue yet by a federal court-<me that has been relied 
on several times prior to its vacatur. See, e.g., Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(citing the case in declining to grant a Bivens remedy to a federal inmate in a privately-run prison). As 
such, it remains an excellent case to study in detail. 
27 Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1093. 
28 /d. at 1096-1101 & n.5. 
29 /d. at II 0 I. 
30 /d. 
31 /d. at 1102. 
32 Id. 
33 /d. 
34 While noting both some "tension between Carlson and Malesko," and that "[t]he Malesko 
Court's reading of Carlson perhaps is not the only reading of that case," the Court nonetheless felt it 
"prudent to follow [Malesko,] the Court's most recent pronouncement on the issue." ld. (citation 
omitted). 
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extending Bivens in Carlson was 'to provide an otherwise nonexistent 
cause of action against individual officers. "'35 Summarizing its holding, 
the Court stated: "a Bivens claim should not be implied unless the plaintiff 
has no other means of redress . . . arising under either state or federal 
law .... "36 
Since Peoples, both the Fourth Circuit and many district courts have 
followed the Tenth Circuit's lead.37 And even more recently, the Supreme 
Court may have endorsed this view, albeit somewhat vaguely. In Wilkie v. 
Robbins, the Court considered whether a Bivens action was available to a 
plaintiff who had suffered a long series of constitutional wrongs at the 
hands of federal officials.38 For many of the wrongs, the Court considered 
whether alternative remedies were available, some of which sounded in 
state tort law.39 In the end, however, the Court was unable to conclude 
whether alternative remedies-state or otherwise-were indeed available 
and thus resolved the suit on other grounds.40 It appears, therefore, that the 
state remedy rule, at the very least, has significant traction in the Supreme 
Court. 
35 /d. (citation omitted). 
36 /d. at 1103. 
37 See, e.g., Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that an inmate in a 
privately run federal prison may not bring a Bivens action where state law provides an effective 
remedy); Longmire v. Carroll, No. 3-06-CV-1503-P, 2006 WL 3542707, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 
2006) (dismissing a Bivens action because the plaintiff could seek redress under state law); Walker v. 
United States, No. CV F 02 5801, 2006 WL 2864632, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2006) (holding that the 
plaintiff could not bring a Bivens action against employees of a privately run prison because he could 
seek alternative remedies in state court); Pollard v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. CV F 01 6078 OWW 
WMW P, 2006 WL 2661111, at *3 (E. D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff could not bring 
a Bivens suit against employees of a privately run prison where state court remedies are available); 
Powell v. Ellis, No. CV F 05 0134 AWl WMW P, 2006 WL 2621049, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 
2006) ("In light of the existing alternative remedies available to Plaintiff, the court finds that extending 
Bivens would not provide Plaintiff with an otherwise nonexistent cause of action."); Godoy-Aguirre v. 
Gilkey, No. CV F 03 5295 OWW UO P, 2006 WL 2585040, at *3, 5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2006) 
(reasoning that Bivens should not be extended because the plaintiff "has alternative and superior 
remedies available to him in state court"); Brown v. Pugh, No. CV 306-25, 2006 WL 2439859, at *2-3 
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that Bivens actions do not extend to causes of action against private 
prison employees where the plaintiff may seek alternative remedies); Kundra v. Johnson, No. H-06-
710, 2006 WL 1061913, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2006) (holding that a Bivens action is not required 
against employees of a privately run prison "where state law provides [the plaintifl] with an effective 
remedy"). But see Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 361-63 (D.N.J. 2004) (holding that a Bivens 
action may be asserted against employees of a private corporation under contract with the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service); Sarro v. Cornell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63-64 (D.R.I. 2003) 
(applying Bivens to a federal prisoner's claim of alleged constitutional violations by employees at a 
privately-operated prison). 
38 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2593 (2007). 
39 /d. at 2598-99 & n.7 (considering whether an action for "intrusion upon seclusion" under 
Wyoming tort law might lie against government employees for allegedly taking pictures of the 
plaintiff's guests during their visits to his ranch). 
40 /d. at 2608. 
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B. Alternative State Remedies and Section 1983 
Much like the early Bivens jurisprudence, Section 1983 suits have 
historically taken note of alternative remedies provided by Congress but 
disregarded remedies provided by state law. Thus, where Congress 
provides a "comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with 
individual enforcement under§ 1983," courts typically refuse to recognize 
Section 1983 actions.41 But where the alternate remedy emanated from 
state law, it was considered irrelevant. The Section 1983 suit did not 
depend on either the existence or prior exhaustion of the available state 
remedies. Hence, the Court explained in Monroe v. Pape that "the fact that 
Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and 
seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court. '"42 And with 
regard to exhaustion, the Court in Steffel v. Thompson held that "[ w ]hen 
federal claims are premised on [§ 1983] ... , we have not required 
exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the 
paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect 
constitutional rights.'.-43 
Though this rule remains largely intact, two important cases suggest 
that it is no longer sacrosanct. In Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, the Court established a 
two-part standard for determining whether a takings claim against a state is 
ripe.44 To establish ripeness, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that "the 
government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached 
a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property 
at issue.'.-45 Next, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has sought 
"compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing 
so.'.-46 Williamson County's conflict with Section 1983's no-exhaustion 
principle is obvious and has been widely criticized.47 Yet criticisms of 
41 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (holding that federal enforcement regime did 
not preclude a Section 1983 action); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1021 (1984) (refusing§ 1983 
action in light of alternate federal remedies); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'! Sea Clammers 
Assoc., 453 U.S. I, 20-21 (1981) (same). 
42 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). 
43 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,472-73 (1974). 
44 Williamson County Reg'! Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985). 
45 /d. at 186. 
46 /d. at 194. 
47 J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County's Troubling State Procedures Rule: How the 
England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal 
Courthouse Door To Ripe Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 210 & n.5 (2003) 
(criticizing Williamson County and collecting other articles); Henry Paul Monaghan, State Law 
Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 989 (1986) 
("No authority supports use of ripeness doctrine to bar federal judicial consideration of an otherwise 
sufficiently focused controversy simply because corrective state judicial process had not been 
invoked."). 
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Williamson County have typically been accompanied by proposed doctrinal 
innovations allowing the plaintiff to ultimately obtain federal review of the 
claim.48 
Whatever viability these innovations once had, they are now 
foreclosed. In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled in San Remo Hotel v. City of 
San Francisco that federal courts hearing takings claims after state court 
adjudications pursuant to Williamson County must grant the state court 
decision preclusive effect as required by the federal full faith and credit 
statute.49 Although the majority recognized that "a significant number of 
plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal takings claims in state 
courts," it claimed that it was simply not "free to disregard the full faith 
and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal forum."50 
Recognizing that the force of the full faith and credit statute could not be 
ignored, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy 
and Thomas, turned his attention to Williamson County in a concurring 
opinion.51 While Rehnquist admitted to "join[ing] the opinion of the Court 
in Williamson County," he thought that the "Court should [at a separate 
time] reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment takings 
claim based on the final decision of a state or local government entity must 
first seek compensation in state courts."52 In his view, "the justifications 
for [the] state-litigation requirement are suspect, while its impact on 
takings plaintiffs is dramatic."53 
Thus, the Court's decisions in Williamson County and San Remo Hotel 
suggest that the Section 1983 action is no longer the exclusive province of 
federal law and jurisdiction. While federal law is still operative in takings 
cases, it is applied in state, rather than federal, courts. Despite this shift 
from past practices, the Court has not yet signaled a willingness to shift the 
doctrine further-such as it has in Bivens, where state tort law has begun to 
supplant federal constitutional law. Nonetheless, this further shift is quite 
plausible, especially considering the new composition of the Court and 
existing precedent requiring the adjudication of federal rights occur in state 
courts. If state courts are considered competent to adjudicate these claims, 
it may not be long before state law-already considered adequate in Bivens 
suits-is considered adequate for Section 1983 claims as well. 
48 See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal 
and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1211, 1270 (2004) (arguing that takings plaintiffs can "reserve" 
their federal claims pursuant to England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 
(1964) such that federal courts may re-assert jurisdiction after the state proceedings have concluded); 
see generally Breemer, supra note 47, at 253-57 (addressing alternatives). 
49 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323,326--27 (2005). 
50 /d. at 346--4 7. 
51 /d. at 348. 
52 /d. at 352. 
S3 /d. 
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III. THE HISTORICAL IRRELEVANCE OF ALTERNATIVE STATE REMEDIES 
Unlike the recent cases discussed above, state remedies have 
historically been irrelevant to constitutional tort actions. The reason for 
this owes directly to the Fourteenth Amendment. With the enactment of 
the Amendment in 1868 the "the federal government . . . [bore] primary 
responsibility for protecting individuals' rights from . . . infringement. "54 
Of course, by granting the federal government such power, state authority 
had to give way. Yet, "principles of federalism that might otherwise be an 
obstacle to congressional authority [were] necessarily overridden by the 
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate 
legislation. "'55 In this sense, the Civil War amendments were "specifically 
designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state 
sovereignty."56 Yet the Fourteenth Amendment did not operate alone. 
Other statutes, which remain with us today, also played an important role. 
Passed in 1871, the Ku Klux Klan Act (now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983) 
"interpose[ d] the federal courts between the States and the people, as 
guardians of the people's federal rights .... "57 Similarly, by granting the 
federal courts habeas jurisdiction in 186758 and general federal question 
jurisdiction in 1875,59 the federal government reiterated its commitment to 
protecting federal rights. The federal commitment to civil rights did not in 
any way prohibit states from enacting their own civil rights legislation. 
Rather, it merely established that federal civil rights would be enforced 
without regard to state law or courts. 
In the ensuing decades, this principle hardened into doctrine. A 
prominent and early example is Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City 
of Los Angeles.60 In Home Telephone, a telephone company argued that a 
54 Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due 
Process, and the Bill Of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 885 (2003). 
55 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and 
Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REv. Ill, 122 (1998) ("The Fourteenth and 
other post-Civil War Amendments, on any historical account, changed the relationship of the federal 
government to the state governments. Congress' Section 5 enforcement power contemplated direct 
federal impositions on the states, who are the parties addressed by the major substantive rules of those 
amendments."). 
56 City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179. 
57 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972). 
58 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000); 39th Cong. § 28 (1867). 
59 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 43d Cong. § 137 (1875). According to Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, 
once granted general federal question jurisdiction, the federal courts "ceased to be restricted tribunals 
of fair dealing between citizens of different states and became the primary and powerful reliances for 
vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States." FELIX 
FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928); see also Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax 
Comrn'n, 515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995) (stating that before 1875, state courts were often the only forum in 
which one could vindicate a federal right); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (relying on 
Frankfurter & Landis's view of federal jurisdiction). 
60 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278,294-95 (1913). 
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Los Angeles ordinance set local telephone rates "so unreasonably low that 
their enforcement would bring about the confiscation of [their] 
property . . . and hence the ordinance was repugnant to the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."61 Los Angeles argued in response 
that a federal court ought not hear the case because the "Constitution of the 
State of California ... [also] provides that 'No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law"' and that the 
telephone company "has never invoked the aid or protection" of the state 
due process clause.62 In Los Angeles' view, a plaintiff must first exhaust 
all available relief under state law before seeking redress under federal law. 
The Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument. First, it found 
Los Angeles' argument to be based on "an artificial construction [of] the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."63 "[T]he provisions of the 
Amendment ... are generic in their terms, [and] are addressed, of course, 
to the States, but also to every person whether natural or juridical who is 
the repository of [the] state .... "64 Thus, a Fourteenth Amendment 
violation is complete and actionable in federal court at the moment a state 
official transgresses the Amendment, regardless of whether the plaintiff 
has access to or seeks a state remedy. 65 
Second, and more dramatically, the Court held that Los Angeles' 
argument "wholly misconceiv[es] the scope and operation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."66 The argument would "remov[e] from the 
control of that Amendment the great body of rights which it was intended 
it should safeguard and ... tak[e] out of reach of its prohibitions the 
wrongs which it was the purpose of the Amendment to condemn."67 In the 
Court's view, the Fourteenth Amendment had force of its own and was not 
merely an alternate source of relief that sprung into existence when local 
state remedies were impotent. The federal government assumed this 
responsibility, in part, out of a fear the states would not do so.68 
61 !d. at 281. 
62 !d. 
63 !d. at 286. 
64 !d. 
65 For further explanation of this view, see Michael Wells, "Available State Remedies" and the 
Fourteenth Amendment: Comments on Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 
1665, 1667 (2000) ("A central principle of constitutional law, established in Home Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, is that the constitutional violation is complete when officials act, 
even if their conduct is not authorized by state law.") (footnote omitted) and Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 343, 359 (explaining that "Home 
Telephone ... and ... at least four decades of constitutional tort litigation ushered in by the 1961 
decision in Monroe v. Pape" held that "federal constitutional rights (Home Telephone) and federal 
remedies for violation of those rights (Monroe) do not depend on what state law provides"). 
66 Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 286. 
61 !d. 
68 For an excellent historical account of the events and ideologies ultimately giving rise to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 26-56 (1986). 
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Screws v. United States, a 1945 case with a holding similar to Home 
Telephone, nicely illustrates the conflict between state and federal 
sovereignty in the civil rights field.69 Set in Georgia during the Jim Crow 
era, Screws involved "a shocking and revolting episode in law 
enforcement."7° Claude Screws, the white sheriff of Baker County, 
Georgia allegedly had a "grudge against [Robert Hall, an African 
American,] and had threatened to 'get' him."71 Late one night, after 
drinking at a local bar, Screws and several other officers arrested Hall for 
the theft of a tire.72 Hall was handcuffed and taken to the courthouse. 
When Hall arrived at the courthouse and began to exit the car, Screws and 
the other officers 
began beating him with their fists and with a solid-bar 
blackjack about eight inches long and weighing two pounds. 
They claimed Hall had reached for a gun and had used 
insulting language as he alighted from the car. But after Hall, 
still handcuffed, had been knocked to the ground they 
continued to beat him from fifteen to thirty minutes until he 
was unconscious. Hall was then dragged feet first through 
the court-house yard into the jail and thrown upon the floor 
dying. An ambulance was called and Hall was removed to a 
hospital where he died within the hour and without regaining 
consciousness. 73 
The officers were charged with a federal crime making it unlawful to 
"willfully subject[], or cause[] to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, 
Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States."74 A federal court tried and convicted the officers, whereupon they 
appealed, eventually to the Supreme Court. Their argument was not that 
they did not commit the acts alleged; rather it was that "[b ]ecause what 
they did violated the state's laws, the nation cannot reach their conduct."75 
Put another way, the officers argued that "abuse of state power creates 
immunity to federal power."76 
Just as in Home Telephone, the Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that the federal authority to vindicate constitutional rights (whether under 
the Fourteenth Amendment or, as in this case, under a federal statute 
69 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945). 
70 /d. at 92. 
71 !d. at 92-93. 
72 !d. at 92. 
73 /d. at 92-93. 
74 /d. at 93 (citing 18 U.S.C. §52, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000)). 
75 Screws, 325 U.S. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
76 /d. 
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implementing the amendment) only picks up where state authority ends. 
As Justice Rutledge explained in his concurrence, "[ v ]ague ideas of dual 
federalism ... do not nullify what four years of civil strife secured and 
eighty years have verified. For it was abuse of basic civil and political 
rights, by states and their officials, that the Amendment and the enforcing 
legislation were adopted to uproot."77 Of course, the federal supremacy 
implemented by the Fourteenth Amendment did not displace the states' 
prerogative to pass and enforce local law. But it did create an unremitting 
obligation in the states to obey federal law, regardless of state provisions. 
This conception of federalism embodied in the Amendment is essential 
because in 1945 there were reasons to doubt that states would enforce civil 
rights on their own accord. Indeed, this doubt was quite justified in Screws 
itself, as the officers were never charged with any crime by the state of 
Georgia.78 
Though both Home Telephone and Screws held that federal law was to 
be enforced without regard to the content of state law, it was not until 
Monroe v. Pape that the Court squarely addressed the argument that state 
tort law was competent to remedy constitutional harms.79 In Monroe, 
James Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago police officers had, without a 
warrant or other authority, raided his house early in the morning, made his 
family stand naked in their living room, and later held him at the police 
station for ten hours without charges or access to an attorney.80 If true, 
these actions would violate Monroe's federal constitutional rights. Monroe 
sued the individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a 
cause of action for damages and other relief against those who, acting 
"under color of state law," deprive persons of their "rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States.81 
Before the Court was the question of whether the officers, clearly 
without explicit authority to behave as they did, nonetheless acted "under 
color of state law." Finding that the officers acted "under color of state 
law" because they were "clothed with the authority of state law," the Court 
dismissed the argument that Monroe's real remedy was under state tort 
law.82 Under this view, § 1983 only provides plaintiffs such as Monroe 
77 !d. at 116. To quote Justice Rutledge's concurrence should not be read to suggest that the 
majority did not share his view. Indeed, the majority explained: "We hesitate to say that when 
Congress sought to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment [with the criminal statute at issue in Screws,] it 
did a vain thing. We hesitate to conclude that for 80 years this effort of Congress, renewed several 
times, to protect the important rights of the individual guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment has 
been an idle gesture." !d. at 100 (majority opinion). 
78 !d. at 114 n.5 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
79 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). 
80 !d. at 169. 
81 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2000). 
82 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184, 187 (quoting United States v. Classic, 299 U.S. 313, 326 (1941) 
(internal quotation omitted)). 
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with a cause of action where an official state policy violates the U.S. 
Constitution. It does not provide a cause of action to plaintiffs injured at 
the hands of rogue state officers-that is, officers acting in disregard of 
official state policy. Victims of such behavior are not without a remedy, 
however. They may resort to state tort law to collect damages. This view 
did not persuade the Court, however. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Douglas explained: 
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced 
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to 
the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and 
refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that 
Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable 
searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the 
federal court. 83 
Lurking behind this observation was the view, quite apparent in 
Screws, that states might be less-than-devoted to the civil rights of their 
citizens. As Justice Douglas explained it: 
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation [(§ 
1983)] was passed was to afford a federal right in federal 
courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, 
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced 
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, 
privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.84 
Importantly, the Monroe Court was not concerned about the weakness 
of state law; rather it was concerned that legal actors-principally judges, 
lawyers, and perhaps jurors-would fail to enforce facially neutral state 
laws.85 
Ten years after Monroe, the Court again addressed the argument that 
tort law was a competent remedy for constitutional harms. In Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Federal Agents, a plaintiff sought relief for violations of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.86 Unlike Monroe, the plaintiff in Bivens sought 
relief from federal officers and thus could not make use of Section 1983.87 
He therefore asked the Court to imply a cause of action for damages 
directly from the Fourth Amendment. 88 In considering his argument, the 
83 /d. at 183. 
84 /d. at 180. 
85 See id. at 175-83 (reviewing Congressional debate concerning possibility that some legal actors 
might be "unable or unwilling to enforce a state Jaw"). 
86 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,388 (1971). 
87 /d. at 398 n.l (Harlan, J., concurring). 
88 /d. at 390-91. 
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Court had to confront the argument, similar to that in Monroe, that the 
plaintiff's remedy was under state tort law. Yet the Court answered the 
argument differently this time. It did not advert to any "prejudice, passion, 
neglect, [or] intolerance" in state courts; rather, it opined that tort law 
might be "inconsistent, or even hostile" to federal civil rights.89 
This possible "inconsistency" or "hostility" stemmed from the 
particular allegations in Bivens: "agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
acting under claim of federal authority" but without a warrant, knocked on 
the plaintiffs door, requested entry, and were granted such by the plaintiff; 
the agents thereafter "arrested [the plaintiff] for alleged narcotics 
violations, ... manacled petitioner in front of his wife and children, ... 
threatened to arrest the entire family . . . [and] searched the apartment 
from stem to stern."90 While such behavior appears trespassory, the Court 
doubted that a cause of action for trespass would be successful.91 A 
common defense to trespass is consent.92 Thus, "[a] private citizen, 
asserting no authority other than his own, will not normally be liable in 
trespass if he demands, and is granted, admission to another's house. "93 
Here, because the plaintiff consented to the entry of his apartment, it was 
likely, in the Court's view, that his state trespass action would fail. Of 
course, this is not a foregone conclusion. A state court might note that 
"[t]he mere invocation of federal power by a federal law enforcement 
official will normally render futile any attempt to resist an unlawful entry" 
and rule that the consent was obtained through implicit coercion.94 Yet the 
Court had an answer for this as well: 
Nor is it adequate to answer that state law may take into 
account the different status of one clothed with the authority 
of the Federal Government. For just as state law may not 
authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment, 
neither may state law undertake to limit the extent to which 
federal authority can be exercised.95 
Thus, Monroe and Bivens provide two reasons why alternative state 
remedies should be irrelevant to federal civil rights actions. Monroe 
evinces doubt that the processes of state adjudication will fail to provide 
the plaintiff with relief under facially neutral laws, and Bivens evinces 
doubt that the substance of state law will fail to provide the plaintiff with 
relief. 
89 !d. at 394. 
90 !d. at 389. 
91 !d. at 394. 
92 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 8, at 82 (3d ed. 1964). 
93 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394 (citing I F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS§ 1.11 (1956)). 
94 !d. 
95 !d. at 395 (internal citations omitted). 
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IV. QUESTIONING THE PRESUMPTIONS IN MONROE AND BIVENS 
Monroe was decided in 1961;96 Bivens in 1971.97 Times have changed. 
Although it might have been fair at some point to presume state courts and 
law hostile to federal civil rights, this claim is no longer tenable. This Part 
explains why. 
A. "[P]rejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise" 
Constitutional tort actions must be available irrespective of state 
remedies, we are told, because "by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, 
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced . . . by the state 
agencies. "98 This claim is undercut in two principle ways: ( 1) the claimed 
lack of parity between state and federal courts has been cast into significant 
doubt as a tool for case allocation, and (2) common law tort actions against 
federal officers, though based on state law, will take place in federal court, 
not state court. 
In an influential article, Professor Burt Neuborne claimed that 
plaintiffs making civil rights claims will typically fair better in federal 
court.99 He offered three reasons for this: federal judges, on the whole, 
have greater "technical competency" than state judges, have a 
"psychological set" that favors the enforcement of civil rights, and are 
insulated from "majoritarian pressures" to which state judges are 
exposed. 100 To be sure, Neuborne's focus was on federal civil rights 
claims, not state tort claims; but his reasoning is partially transferable. 
Tort claims brought as alternatives to civil rights claims do not demand any 
special expertise of the state judge, but, in testing the lawfulness of law 
enforcement activities, do implicate the state judiciary's willingness to side 
with politically unpopular minorities. 
Since Neuborne propounded his thesis, scholars have endlessly 
debated it. Some scholars continue to side with Neuborne, claiming that 
federal superiority is an "inescapable logical inference."101 Others 
(including the Supreme Court) have disagreed in principle102 while still 
96 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
97 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. 
98 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180. 
99 Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. ll05, 1106 (1977). 
100 ld. at 1120-21. 
101 Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on 
Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333 (I 988); see also RICHARD 
A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 172 (1985) (stating that "systematically different 
conditions of employment" between state and federal judges permit the inference that federal courts are 
superior to state courts in enforcing civil rights). 
102 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 & 494 (1976) (refusing to recognize federal habeas 
claims premised on Fourth Amendment violations in part because of an "unwilling[ ness] to assume that 
there now exists a general Jack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and 
appellate courts of the several States"); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) ("It is 
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others have employed their own logic in refuting Neuborne's claim. 103 
Additionally, a large contingency of scholars have sought to test the claim 
empirically. 104 An interesting example of empirical work suggests that, 
among 86 federal and 307 state judicial decisions involving federal 
constitutional issues implicating gay rights, "state tribunals resolved 
lesbian and gay rights claims 56.3 [percent] more positively than federal 
courts."105 Other scholars have made similar empirical claims with respect 
to Takings claims,106 coerced confession cases/07 and civil rights claims 
more generally. 108 Of course, the empirical evidence is far from uniform in 
its refutation of parity. 109 In sum, whether one employs "logical 
inferences" or empirical methods, there is little agreement among scholars 
as to the current state of parity between state and federal courts. 
Despite this lack of agreement, just about all scholars agree that parity, 
whatever its nature, is highly contingent. First, it is contingent upon the 
particular judicial district and legal right involved. Thus, in some judicial 
districts, federal courts may protect First Amendment rights more faithfully 
than state courts. In those same districts however, state courts may protect 
homosexual rights more faithfully than federal courts. Pick a different 
district, and these claims might be reversed. Second, parity is historically 
contingent. Thus, even if one could generalize across all claims and all 
judicial districts to reach a final conclusion as to which judicial system 
protected individual rights with the greatest frequency, this conclusion 
generally to be assumed that state courts and prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations as 
expounded by this Court, and that the mere possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional 
standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to justifY a disruption of orderly 
state proceedings."); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 
37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 69-70 (1923) ("(T]here is now little danger that the State court will not amply 
protect persons claiming Federal rights."). 
103 Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 605,607-08 (1981). 
104 For an overview of the empirical literature on parity, see Michael E. Solimine, The Future of 
Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1457, 1491-94 (2005). 
105 DANIEL PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 110 (2003); see also William B. 
Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 625 (1999) (concluding, with respect 
to gay rights, that state courts may be as solicitous (or more) than federal courts). 
106 Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower 
Federal Court Interpretations ofNollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 233, 285 (1999) (concluding that there is "strong evidence of parity in the takings area"). 
107 See Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, State Supreme Court Decision Making in 
Confession Cases, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 109, 119, 123, 126 (2002) (analyzing 661 state court confession 
cases and concluding that state courts generally complied with federal supreme court precedent). 
108 MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY 
OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 34--62 (1999) (examining empirical evidence on parity and arguing that it 
demonstrates that claims of federal rights are equally likely to be upheld in state court and federal 
court). 
109 Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences. Case Facts, Context, and 
Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. PoL. 1206, 1206-07 (1997) (claiming in a study of death 
penalty cases that judicial "selection procedures [such as elections] systematically influence, in the long 
term, the overall predispositions of those who occupy the bench"). 
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would no doubt be dated within a few years. This is because courts, being 
populated by human beings, are not static institutions. 110 They change over 
time and thus any claim today that one court system is inferior or superior 
to another is a "contingent argument, intimately connected to the political 
climate of a particular era."111 Building doctrine on such shifting sands is 
unwtse. 
Perhaps this is why some federal courts scholars have deserted the 
parity debate entirely. Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, has expressed 
fear that "the debate over parity is permanently stalemated because parity 
is an empirical question-whether one court system is as good as 
another-for which there never can be any meaningful empirical 
measure."112 Instead, he has sought to "define a role for the federal courts 
without evaluating the comparative abilities of the federal and state courts 
in constitutional cases."113 In his view, federal courts should remain 
available in all civil rights actions not because they are superior, but simply 
because their availability maximizes litigant choice. 114 Barry Friedman has 
taken a similar tact. In a recent paper on allocating cases between federal 
and state courts, he dismisses arguments pertaining to parity because they 
"will never resolve the either-or problem"-which he describes as "the 
common assumption ... that cases must be litigated either in federal court 
or in state court" rather than in both courts sequentially. 115 Like 
Chemerinsky, Friedman views parity as frustrating, rather than advancing, 
the proper allocation of cases between the federal and state courts. 
Thus, no matter how accurate it was in 1961 to claim that state courts 
are systematically possessed by "prejudice, passion, neglect, [or] 
intolerance," the claim is subject to significant doubt today-both with 
regard to specific rights and across the entire spectrum of rights. 
Moreover, even if the claim could be defended as a current description of 
state courts, this description is undoubtedly subject to change and therefore 
is unsuitable as an ongoing presumption. 
I now tum to another reason why claims of state court prejudice lack 
force in situations where constitutional tort claims are recast as state 
110 See Solimine, supra note 104, at 1487 ("Much discourse on parity is characterized by its static 
nature. The respective capabilities of federal and state courts are often described as snapshots, taken at 
the time of the writing. The better view is to examine parity as a fluid and dynamic concept, with 
changes-for good or ill-in both federal and state courts over time."). 
111 Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1293, 1304-05 (2003). 
112 Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 
UCLA L. REv. 233, 236 (1988). 
113 !d. 
114 !d. at 300-26. 
115 Friedman, supra note 48, at 1214, 1221; see also John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of 
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 247, 287 (2007) (stating that, "given the 
current state of knowledge" on parity, "it is impossible at this point to justify a system-wide 
presumption that federal courts are preferable to state courts for plaintiffs advancing federal claims"). 
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common law tort claims: Tort claims against federal officers will 
invariably take place in federal court and at least some tort claims against 
state officers will take place in federal court as well. First, pursuant to 
Federal Tort Claims Act, tort actions against the federal government must 
be litigated in federal court. 116 Even if the relied-upon alternative remedy 
failed to ring in tort, however, federal officers have the independent power 
to remove state court actions to federal court and almost uniformly do 
so. 117 Second, where the tort suit is against a state officer, such claims can 
appear in federal court where the plaintiff and defendant are citizens of 
different states and the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000.ll 8 
While state law enforcement officers typically reside in the state in which 
they work and interact with citizens who reside in the same state, at least 
some interactions will be between persons who reside in different states. 119 
Although constitutional tort actions against federal officers or state officers 
from different states are likely a minority of all constitutional tort actions, 
their numbers are not insignificant. 120 Thus, in a sizeable number of 
constitutional tort actions, the claim that state law alternatives are 
infeasible because of state court prejudice falls flat. 
B. "[I]nconsistent or even hostile" 
In Bivens, the Court offered two reasons why the plaintiff there would 
have difficulty obtaining relief under state tort law. First, state law will 
often be "inconsistent or even hostile" to federal constitutional law. 121 
Thus, the defendants in Bivens could potentially assert the defense of 
consent. Second, even if the plaintiff could convince the court to find such 
consent coerced under state law, state courts are prohibited from 
interpreting "state law to limit the extent to which federal authority can be 
exercised."122 As explained below, close analysis reveals that both of these 
claims stand on weak, if not wholly insupportable, footing. 
The Court's statement in Bivens that state tort law would have been 
116 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l) (2000) (stating that "the district courts ... shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions on [tort] claims against the United States, for money damages"). 
117 See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3) (stating that "[a]ny officer of the courts of the United States" may 
remove a suit filed in state court to federal court where the allegations involve "any act under color of 
office or in the performance of his duties"). 
118 28 u.s.c. § 1332. 
119 These suits are likely to be more common where large metropolitan areas extend across state 
boundaries. Examples include side-by-side cities (such as Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, 
Kansas, or Omaha, Nebraska and Council Bluffs, Iowa) and cities that routinely draw visitors from 
neighboring states (such as New York City, which draws commuters and visitors from New Jersey and 
Connecticut). 
120 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 641, 654 (1987) (finding that Bivens suits comprised "relatively few" of the 
constitutional tort actions sampled in an empirical study). 
121 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,394 (1971). 
122 /d. at 395. 
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"hostile" to a claim of trespass is no doubt insightful to a certain extent. 
Depending on the content of state law, consent will certainly pose a barrier 
to a successful trespass claim. One may reasonably question, however, 
whether this insight applies universally. There are, no doubt, many 
instances where state tort law and constitutional law operate in tandem. 
Both the law of battery and the Fourth Amendment, for example, prohibit 
an officer from beating a pedestrian without provocation. Similarly, both 
the tort of false imprisonment and the Fourth Amendment prohibit an 
officer from stopping a car simply because of the driver's race. Thus, if 
the goal of suing a government officer is to obtain compensation for the 
officer's wrongful behavior, state law will sometimes work quite well. 
Indeed, in many cases, it is not state tort law that is "hostile" to 
compensation, but just the reverse. Compare common law and 
constitutional tort actions against federal officers, for example. Where 
both legal regimes proscribe the same conduct, compensation under tort 
law is likely to be significantly higher than under federal constitutional 
law. This is because official immunity-which bars recovery in the great 
majority of constitutional tort actions-will not bar recovery in common 
law tort suits against the government. In the typical constitutional tort 
action, government officers are immune from "liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."123 
But where the same federal official is sued under tort law, immunity will 
not stand in the way of recovery. 
The reason is the Westfall Act. 124 To understand its operation, 
consider a short hypothetical and the ensuing path of litigation likely to 
result. Suppose a federal law enforcement officer improperly arrests a 
plaintiff-call her Susan-thereby violating her Fourth Amendment rights. 
After her release, Susan files suit against the agent in federal court for false 
imprisonment.125 Her suit would not proceed as styled, however. Rather, 
the suit would be converted into one under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
against the United States itself, and not against the federal agent 
123 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see generally Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate 
Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REv. 261 
(1995) (explaining official immunity analysis in constitutional tort cases). 
124 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
694, 102 Stat. 4563 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), (d) (2000)) (commonly referred to as the "Westfall 
Act"). 
125 Susan could, of course, file suit in state court instead. For simplicity's sake, however, I have 
Susan begin her case in federal court. Even if she filed first in state court, her suit would end up in 
federal court under either 28 U.S.C. § 1442, which grants federal defendants the right to remove state 
suits to federal court, or 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b )(I), which requires suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
to be heard only in federal courts. Regardless of these two provisions, Susan can begin her suit in 
federal court if she is of diverse citizenship from the defendant and seeks more than $75,000. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (granting original jurisdiction to federal courts in suits that involve both an 
amount in controversy exceeding $75,000 and citizens of different states). 
2008] ALTERNATIVE STATE REMEDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 745 
individually. This conversion is mandated by the Westfall Act, a 1988 
amendment to the FTCA.126 Under the Westfall Act, a suit against a 
federal employee for a "negligent or wrongful act" may not proceed 
against the employee; rather, the plaintiffs "exclusive" remedy is against 
only the United States itself under the FTCA. 127 And under the FTCA, the 
federal government will be liable to the plaintiff "under circumstances 
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant 
in accordance with the law of the place where the [negligent or wrongful 
act] occurred."128 Importantly, even if state officers might be immune 
from a damages penalty under state law for such behavior, federal officers 
will not be. 129 
To be sure, there are some gaps in the federal government's waiver of 
sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act. For example, the 
government is not liable in tort where the claim is based on the 
"perform[ance] [of] a discretionary function."130 Nor is the government 
126 The statute, commonly referred to as the Westfall Act, was a response to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988). In Westfall, the Court held that federal officers did 
not have absolute immunity from tort suits based on conduct committed within the scope of their 
employment. Westfall, 484 U.S. at 294-95. Finding such exposure to liability poor policy, Congress 
effectively granted federal employees absolute immunity by requiring any tort claim against a federal 
employee be recast as one against the United States exclusively. See Federal Employees Liability 
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 § 2(a), (b) ("It is the purpose of this Act to protect Federal 
employees from personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of their 
employment, while providing persons injured by the common law torts of Federal employees with an 
appropriate remedy against the United States."). For a discussion of the Westfall Act, see William P. 
Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and its Employees for Torts 
and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 1105, 1172-76 (1996). 
127 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b). To be sure, not every putative Bivens claim recast under state law would 
be converted into a FTCA action against the federal government. For example, if a prisoner sued the 
guard of a private prison under contract with the federal government, the Westfall Act exclusivity rule 
would not apply because that suit would not be against a federal employee, but rather against an 
independent contractor. Independent contractors are not covered by the FTCA. See id § 2671 
(explicitly excluding contractors); United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814-15 (1976) (holding that 
an entity is an employee rather than an independent contractor only if the federal government has the 
power to "to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor" on a "day-to-day" basis) 
(citations omitted). 
128 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l). 
129 See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) (stating that, because ''the United States 
waives sovereign immunity 'under circumstances' where local law would make a 'private person' 
liable in tort," any official or municipal immunity created by state law are not applicable in FTCA suits 
against the federal government). 
130 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Under Supreme Court precedent, a government action is discretionary if 
it "involves an element of judgment or choice" which is "based on considerations of public policy." 
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536--37 (1988) (citations omitted). Importantly, if a "federal 
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow," the 
act is not discretionary because ''the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive." 
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). Although 
precedent in the courts of appeal is not uniform, the majority of courts hold that the discretionary 
function exception cannot be used as a defense if the alleged misbehavior amounts to a constitutional 
violation. See, e.g., Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 758 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[F]ederal officials do not 
possess discretion to violate constitutional rights.") (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 
837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988)); Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We 
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liable for "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights" if such claims are brought against non-
law enforcement officers. 131 Importantly, however, if such claims are 
brought against a law enforcement officer, they are cognizable under the 
FTCA.132 Additionally, punitive damages are not available under the 
FTCA.133 Despite these limitations, however, official immunity in the field 
of constitutional torts is such a tremendous burden to overcome that FTCA 
actions will, on the whole, likely provide greater compensation to the 
plaintiff than the constitutional tort action.134 Thus, contrary to the Court's 
claim in Bivens, federal law, rather than state law, may be the law hostile 
to recovery. 
Tort suits against state officers, however, are more difficult to 
summarize. As a general matter, state waivers of immunity are narrower 
than the federal govemment's. 135 If one focuses on the particular field of 
torts analogous to constitutional violations, however, one sees that the 
opportunities for suit are, on the whole, rather plentiful. For example, only 
hold only that the Constitution can limit the discretion of federal officials such that the FTCA's 
discretionary function exception does not apply."); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th 
Cir. 1987) ("[W]e have not hesitated to conclude that [law enforcement activity] does not fall within 
the discretionary function of [28 U.S.C.] § 2680(a) when governmental agents exceed the scope of their 
authority as designated by statute or the Constitution."); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 837 F.2d at 120 
("[C]onduct cannot be discretionary if it violates the Constitution, a statute, or an applicable 
regulation.") (dicta). Only the D.C. Circuit has disagreed. See Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 196-97 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[W]here the 'allegation of improper investigatory conduct is inextricably tied to the 
decision to prosecute and the presentation of evidence to the Grand Jury,' the discretionary function 
applies and preserves governmental immunity.") (quoting Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 516 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)). 
131 28 u.s.c. § 2680(h). 
132 /d. A law enforcement officer is defined as "any officer of the United States who is 
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal 
law." /d. Although federal courts have split on whether prison guards are "investigative or law 
enforcement agents," the Supreme Court plans to address that issue in its 2007-08 term. See Abdus-
Shahid M.S. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 204 F. App'x 778 (lith Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. 
Ct. 2875 (U.S. May 29, 2007) (No. 06-9130). Still, even if prison guards are held not to be "law 
enforcement agents," a great number of suits may still proceed against federal agents working outside 
prisons. Moreover, even if a federal prisoner is barred from relying on the FTCA's intentional tort 
provision, she can often restyle her claim as one for negligence. Claims of negligence are actionable 
against all federal employees, not just those who are "investigative or law enforcement officers." See 
Flechsig v. United States, 991 F.2d 300, 302 n.l, 303-04 (6th Cir. 1993) (considering, under the 
FTCA, prisoner's negligent supervision claim flowing from sexual assault by a guard). 
133 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title 
relating to tort claims ... but shall not be liable ... for punitive damages."); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 
30, 31 (1983) (holding punitive damages available in§ 1983 action); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 
(1980) (stating that "punitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit"). 
134 See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials' 
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L. J. 65, 65-66, 80 (1999) (explaining that Bivens suits 
rarely result in an assessment of damages and that "[q]ualified immunity is undoubtedly the most 
significant bar" to recovery). 
135 Lawrence Rosentha~ A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional 
Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 805-09 (2007) (containing comprehensive summary of 
state waivers of immunity for tort suits). 
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"seventeen [states] immunize specified intentional torts of public 
employees," and a still smaller number immunize liability for the 
"institution of judicial or administrative proceedings," or for the failure to 
"provide adequate jails or other correctional or penal facilities."136 By 
implication, many states do not immunize themselves from these types of 
suits, thus suggesting that state tort suits will be successful in numerous 
instances. This is not to say that, in some cases, the constitutional tort 
action will not provide greater recovery. That is certainly likely. But on 
the whole, when one takes into account the often insurmountable barrier of 
official immunity, state tort suits will quite often provide superior 
compensation. In short, state tort law may be anything but "hostile" to 
plaintiffs harmed by the state. 
The Court's related claim in Bivens-that state law is impotent to 
control federal behavior-also stands on weak footing. At the outset, one 
must recognize that this claim can only apply to constitutional tort actions 
against the federal government, as states certainly have the authority to 
subject state officers to state tort law. Thus, the "weakness of state law" 
claim only has force with respect to alternative state remedies for Bivens 
actions. With respect to these suits, however, it is not at all clear that state 
law is indeed impotent. Recall that the Court, in proffering this argument, 
was responding to the claim that state law might be interpreted so as to 
account for the inherently coercive nature of a consent sought by law 
enforcement officers. As the court explained: 
Nor is it adequate to answer that state law may take into 
account the different status of one clothed with the authority 
of the Federal Government. For just as state law may not 
authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment, 
neither may state law undertake to limit the extent to which 
federal authority can be exercised.137 
This claim is curious, however. It seems to suggest that state law, 
rather than state courts, is impotent to regulate the conduct of federal 
officials. This certainly can not be true, however, since the Federal Tort 
Claims Act unequivocally renders the federal government liable "under 
circumstances where . . . a private person . . . would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the [negligent or 
wrongful act] occurred."138 Even if one interprets the FTCA as 
incorporating state law as the standard of care, rather than giving force to 
state law on its own, it is nonetheless "settled that the state courts may 
136 /d. at 805-09. 
137 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 
(internal citations omitted). 
138 28 u.s.c. 1346(b ). 
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entertain actions against federal officers for damages" under state law .139 
Despite the Court's invocation of "state law" in Bivens, it is more 
likely that the Court's worry was over the power of state courts. This 
much is revealed by a footnote in Davis v. Passman, a Bivens action from 
1981. There, the Court stated that: 
Respondent does not dispute petitioner's claim that she 
"has no cause of action under Louisiana law." And it is far 
from clear that a state court would have authority to effect a 
damages remedy against a United States Congressman for 
illegal actions in the course of his official conduct, even if a 
plaintiffs claim were grounded in the United States 
Constitution. Deference to state-court adjudication in a case 
such as this would in any event not serve the purposes of 
federalism, since it involves the application of the Fifth 
Amendment to a federal officer in the course of his federal 
duties. It is therefore particularly appropriate that a federal 
court be the forum in which a damages remedy be 
awarded. 140 
Whatever the correctness of this statement, 141 the Court seems to have 
ignored that suits for relief against federal officers must be adjudicated in 
federal court under the FTCA. 142 There can be little doubt, of course, that 
federal courts have the power to order federal officers to pay damages for 
their tortious conduct. Thus, by virtue of the FTCA's liability and 
jurisdictional commands, federal officers can be held liable under state law 
and be ordered to pay damages. 
* * * 
In sum, whatever the original force of the Court's justifications for 
139 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4213, at 45 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
140 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,245 n.23 (1979) (citations omitted). 
141 State court authority over federal officers is contradictory in some respects. While it has long 
been clear that state courts may not grant a mandamus against a federal officer, McLung v. Silliman, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 605 (1821), or grant state habeas relief to a federal prisoner, Tarble's Case, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1872), damages remedies against federal officers have long been 
permitted. See Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 344 (1865) (stating a federal officer may be 
held liable for exceeding his authority); Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 292 (1851) (holding 
that a postal employee can be held liable for conversion "in any court having civil jurisdiction"); see 
also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WESCHLER'S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 441 (5th ed. 2003) ("The Supreme Court has routinely sustained state court jurisdiction in 
damages actions against federal officials averring tortuous [sic] conduct unsupported by the claimed 
authority."). 
142 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l) (requiring suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act to be heard only in 
federal courts). Admittedly, it is unclear whether the FTCA, together with state tort law, would apply 
to the misbehavior in Davis, thus placing any tort suit against Davis in federal court. Davis is an 
exceptional case, however, and a great many constitutional tort claims will, at least facially, fall within 
the ambit of the FTCA. 
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ignoring state remedies in Monroe and Bivens, those justifications are now 
quite weak. State courts are no longer possessed by the "prejudice, 
passion, neglect, [or] intolerance" that they were in 1961, and whatever 
their level of prejudice as compared to federal courts, it is certainly likely 
to change over time and with respect to specific types of claims. Nor is 
state tort law necessarily "hostile" to recovery. In fact, it will often 
provide greater compensation than federal law, and can be validly enforced 
by state courts against state officers, or by federal courts against federal 
officers. 
V. NEW REASONS TO IGNORE ALTERNATIVE STATE REMEDIES 
In the previous Part, I argued that the justifications for ignoring state 
remedies stand on weak footing. 143 That might suggest that courts should 
begin considering the force of state remedies in constitutional tort 
adjudication. This Part offers three reasons why that is unwise, followed 
by two additional reasons applicable only to Bivens cases. First, state law, 
while perhaps not always "hostile" to federal civil rights, will often be 
unclear such that a federal court has no way of knowing whether it will 
provide relief. In this sense, state law should be ignored not because it will 
not provide relief, but because it may not provide relief. A plaintiff with a 
valid constitutional claim should not have her suit dismissed in favor of a 
state law claim that might be valid. Second, this difficulty in ascertaining 
the true effect of state law will only be compounded by the procedural 
juncture at which such issues are likely to arise. Defendants will likely 
proffer arguments based on alternative state remedies in motions to 
dismiss-a stage of litigation far in advance of any factual development 
that might inform the true availability of state remedies. Third, the mere 
task of determining whether alternative state remedies exist may have 
deleterious effects on state law--effects often identified with federal 
adjudication of state law in the post-Erie era. After offering these three 
points, this Part then offers two further reasons-applicable only to Bivens 
cases-to ignore state remedies. Bivens cases, which involve federal law 
and federal defendants, present no compelling reason to respect state 
interests or state law, and even if they did, relying on state remedies brings 
the doctrine into direct conflict with Carlson v. 
Green144 -a case indispensable to the current Bivens jurisprudence. 
A. The Inherent Ambiguity of State Law With Regard to Federal Civil 
Rights 
The state remedy rule proceeds from the presumption that state tort law 
143 See supra Part IV.A, B. 
144 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,23-25 (1980). 
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and federal constitutional law operate in similar, if not identical, fashions. 
In one sense, this presumption is not entirely unwarranted. Both legal 
regimes regulate the imposition of force by one individual against another. 
Police brutality that violates the Fourth Amendment will also likely violate 
state battery law. But this presumption only goes so far. Many 
unconstitutional acts only vaguely resemble common law torts. This 
should not be surprising, since the two regimes have fundamentally 
different focuses. Tort law generally addresses interactions between 
private individuals and constitutional law addresses interactions between 
the government and private individuals. It is thus unlikely that tort law 
will contain doctrines that can adequately capture behavior understood to 
be unconstitutional. 145 
Consider the following: 
A stop-and-frisk. Suppose a police officer, acting without 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, stops a pedestrian on the 
street and pats him down. This is clearly unconstitutional, 146 but is 
it a tort? It looks quite similar to a battery, which occurs when one 
intentionally touches another in a harmful or offensive manner. 147 
While a non-consensual pat down is clearly "offensive" it is much 
less clear whether the officer's behavior was intentional. Certainly 
it was intentional in the sense that he willed his body to touch the 
pedestrian's body, but did he will that the contact be "offensive"? 
This is a much more difficult question. Some courts hold that a 
plaintiff advancing a battery claim need prove that the defendant 
intended the touching only, 148 while other courts hold that the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended the touching and 
intended it be offensive. 149 Even if a court is able to discern the 
14s Others have noted this in a more general sense. See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 
Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1738-50 (1989) (addressing the 
deleterious "implications of tort rhetoric"); Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 715, 758 (2006) ("Using tort law to remedy torture [by the U.S. government] is like 
using nuisance law to handle the generation and disposal of hazardous wastes. In each situation, the 
problem is simply much bigger and badder than the problems for which the law was designed."); 
Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 661, 686 (1997) ("It is dangerous to defme constitutional claims as a narrow subset of tort law 
because tort law has been particularly ineffective in dealing with precisely the sorts of interests and 
injuries that are at the center of constitutional law."). 
146 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20--21 (1968) (holding that an arresting officer must be able to 
point to particular facts, which taken together with inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants 
stopping and searching a suspect). 
147 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 52-53 (2000). 
148 See, e.g., White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 109 (Idaho 1990) (reasoning that the intent 
requirement for battery is simply the intent to cause an unpermitted contact). 
149 See, e.g., Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 390 (La. 1987) ("A harmful or offensive contact 
with a person, resulting from an act intended to cause him to suffer such a contact, is a battery."). 
Professor Dan Dobbs suggests that the Restatement (Second) of Torts likely adopts this approach. See 
DOBBS, supra note 147, § 30, at 58-59 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 13 (1965)). 
2008] ALTERNATIVE STATE REMEDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 751 
content of state law on this point-which is often much easier said 
than done150-it could be quite difficult to apply in a stop-and-frisk 
context. If state law requires proof that the defendant intended his 
touching to be offensive, a court must grapple with the difficult 
and quite odd question of whether a stop-and-frisk was 
intentionally "offensive"? Put to the side the case where the 
officer knowingly violates the Fourth Amendment and simply 
wants to offend someone he dislikes. Consider instead the more 
difficult-and more common--case where an officer reasonably-
but-mistakenly believes there is reasonable suspicion to frisk the 
plaintiff. On the one hand, it might be argued that the officer 
could be "substantially certain" that offense would ensue, which 
courts routinely hold is tantamount to intent. 151 On the other hand, 
this would entail holding that reasonable behavior can 
simultaneously be "offensive," clearly a discordant result. 
Resolving this conundrum will not be an easy task. 
Custodial interrogation. A federal law enforcement officer 
approaches a pedestrian and states, "Could you step into my car to 
speak with me?" The officer knows that he does not have the 
authority to order her into the car, and is thus careful to phrase his 
words as a request rather than an order. The pedestrian complies, 
but only because she reasonably believes that the officer has 
ordered her to do so. Once inside the car, a constitutional violation 
has occurred.152 But has a tort been committed? Under the 
common law of most states, a valid claim for false imprisonment 
typically exists where "the defendant intentionally confined or 
instigated the confinement of the plaintiff ... against her will."153 
The confinement need not be overtly physical; it is enough if the 
plaintiff reasonably believes that she is not free to leave. 154 In this 
case, the facts make clear that the pedestrian reasonably believed 
150 See DoBBS, supra note 147, § 30, at 58 (explaining that, on this issue, "the Restatement and 
some of the cases are ambiguous"). 
151 E.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Wash. 1955) (citation omitted); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A (1965) (stating that, in this context, an actor demonstrates 
intent if he acts believing that the consequences of his act are "substantially certain" to result from his 
act). 
152 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991) (explaining that "[w]hen police attempt to 
question a person who is walking down the street" courts should ask if"a reasonable person would feel 
free to continue walking" to determine whether a seizure occurred). 
153 DOBBS, supra note 14 7, § 36, at 67 (citations omitted). 
154 See, e.g., DeAngelis v. Jamesway Dep't Store, 501 A.2d 561, 562--63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1985) (holding that a seventeen-year-old subjected to shouting, verbal abuse, and the statement 
that she was not free to leave or talk to her parents could reasonably believe that she was not free to 
leave); Black v. Kroger, 527 S.W.2d 794, 796, 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (holding that an eighteen-
year-old employee could reasonably believe she was not free to leave where placed in a windowless 
room with a single door and interrogated by her superiors). 
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that she had to comply with the officer's request. But did the 
officer intend to confine her? Certainly he desired that she get into 
the car, and desired that she remain there. Perhaps from his 
experience, he was "substantially certain" that his request would 
give rise to a feeling of obligation in the pedestrian. Yet it is also 
quite possible that he did not want her to feel confined, since any 
evidence he obtained in that fashion might be inadmissible at 
trial. 155 Thus, determining the existence of a valid false 
imprisonment claim will be a difficult task. 
Undercover surveillance. Suppose a law enforcement officer 
infiltrates a community group ostensibly dedicated to the 
advancement of peaceful conflict resolution. The officer provides 
the group a false name and feigns agreement with the group's 
cause. Glad to have a new member, no one in the group asks 
whether the new "member" is actually a police officer or there for 
some other purpose. This behavior might be a Fourth Amendment 
violation, but it is unclear whether it would be a tort. Perhaps it 
could be cast as an intrusion upon seclusion, which involves an 
invasion into a plaintiffs private sphere, a place where the plaintiff 
had "reasonable expectation of privacy in the place, the materials 
involved, or the subject matter."156 Under this standard, it is clear 
that the group members certainly had a reasonable expectation that 
their group would not be placed under surveillance-which is what 
seemed to occur in this situation. Indeed, courts have held that 
eavesdropping amounts to an unlawful intrusion.157 Casting the 
officer's behavior as eavesdropping, however, is a bit misleading. 
He was sitting right in front of them during the entire meeting, an 
act to which the members clearly consented. One might argue that 
the officer obtained this consent through false pretenses, but this 
might entail some difficult line-drawing problems. No doubt many 
people join groups for a variety of reasons, some of which may not 
clearly align with the stated purpose of the group.158 Thus, a court 
considering this case would be faced with difficult and uncommon 
questions of law not likely addressed in state tort doctrine. 159 
155 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of a 
defendant's constitutional rights may not be used at trial against the defendant). 
156 DOBBS, supra note 147, § 426, at 1200. 
157 See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 241-42 (N.H. 1964) (holding that listening 
device implanted in wall of marital bedroom was an invasion of privacy); DOBBS, supra note 147, 
§ 426, at 1202 (stating that electronic means oflistening amount to ''virtual trespass"). 
158 As a case in point, the author of this Article once joined a dreadfully boring book group during 
law school simply because he had a crush on a woman in the group. (Cindy, if you're out there, I'm 
TOTALLY over you!!!!!!!!) 
159 One might alternatively cast the officer's behavior as a trespass, though this would inevitably 
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Prison conditions. Suppose a prison deprives an inmate of 
access to a toilet for several days. This is an Eighth Amendment 
violation but may or may not be a tort. 160 While tort law does not 
generally impose a duty on individuals to affirmatively care for 
others, it does impose such a duty on "[ o ]ne who is required by 
law to take ... the custody of another under circumstances such as 
to deprive the other of his [or her] normal opportunities for 
protection."161 Under this duty, the prison must protect the inmate 
"against unreasonable risk of physical harm." 162 But a court 
considering this question would have to discern whether forcing 
another to forgo normal bodily functions for several days causes 
"physical harm" as recognized by that tort. Even if it were clear 
that the prisoner's severe discomfort did not amount to physical 
harm, a court must also consider whether the deprivation would 
amount to an intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs 
may collect for pure emotional distress upon a showing that the 
defendant intentionally or recklessly caused extreme emotional 
distress by extreme or outrageous conduct. 163 Even before delving 
into the case law (which is no doubt limited on this issue), it is 
immediately apparent that much of what prisons do--by 
design-is to cause emotional distress. Solitary confinement, 
dietary restrictions, and many other measures are routinely 
implemented to discipline prisoners. 164 While these measures 
lead to the same problem, namely whether the group members consented to the officer's behavior. See 
DOBBS, supra note 147, §50, at 95 (explaining that consent is a defense to trespass). 
160 See Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing numerous cases on the 
minimum level of hygiene required by the Eighth Amendment). 
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965). For cases applying this duty to a 
prison, see Delasky v. Village of Hinsdale, 441 N.E.2d 367, 370-71, 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding 
that guards who failed to find a belt that an incoming prisoner used to hang himself were not negligent 
because the guards had no reason to know that the prisoner was suicidal); Heumphreus v. State, 334 
N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 1983) (finding that the survivors of a deceased prisoner may bring a tort action 
against the prison for alleged negligent post-heart attack care, if the attack was not work-related); Lang 
v. City of Des Moines, 294 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1980) (holding that, in a wrongful death action for 
the death of a prisoner, while police officers could not force a prisoner to submit to detoxification 
treatment against her will and owed no duty to return to the treatment center, they did have a duty to 
give aid upon knowledge that the decedent was injured); Thornton v. City of Flint, 197 N.W.2d 485, 
491-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the duty of care to a prisoner increases when police officer 
is aware or should be aware of a prisoner's special condition that places the prisoner at peril); Shea v. 
City of Spokane, 562 P.2d 264, 267-68 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the city owed a 
nondelegable duty to provide adequate medical care and treatment to its inmates); Brownelli v. 
McCaughtry, 514 N.W.2d 48, 50-51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that prison employees owe a duty 
to provide prisoners with prompt medical attention). 
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314A(l)(a) (1965). 
163 !d. § 46(1 ). 
164 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (noting that "prisoners do not shed all 
constitutional rights at the prison gate but 'lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal 
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our 
penal system'") (internal citations omitted); Williams v. Coughlin, 875 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (W.D.N.Y. 
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sometimes transgress the Eighth Amendment, it will be quite 
difficult to determine whether they also amount to an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
A warrantless e-mail interception. Suppose the federal 
government develops a program to intercept and read all e-mails 
sent within the United States containing a combination of words 
often seen in e-mails between known terrorists. Such a program 
would be unconstitutional, 165 but would it be a tortious intrusion 
upon seclusion? As noted above, a claim for this tort exists where 
one "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns, . . . [and] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person."166 "The case law is clear that the 
offensiveness of the invasion . . . turns on the reasons and 
intentions of the invader."167 Thus, where one invades another's 
privacy simply for personal gratification, whether through the use 
of peep holes/68 listening devices/69 or opening of another's 
1995) (noting that "while no court has explicitly held that denial of food is a per se violation of a 
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, under certain circumstances a substantial deprivation offood may 
well be recognized as being of constitutional dimension") (citation omitted). 
165 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures regardless of whether there is a physical intrusion). 
Note that a program intercepting emails arriving from abroad may be constitutional. See United States 
v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972) (noting that the Katz rule may not apply in 
circumstances where the president exercises his "surveillance power with respect to the activities of 
foreign powers, within or without this country"). Several other courts have come to similar 
conclusions. See United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that "because of 
the need of the executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional 
competence, the courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts 
foreign intelligence surveillance."); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding 
that "[ f]oreign security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the general warrant requirement and 
disclosure of wiretaps not involving illegal surveillance is within the trial court's discretion"); United 
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605-06 (3d Cir. 1974) (en bane) (holding that "a warrant prior to 
search is not an absolute prerequisite in the foreign intelligence field when the President has authorized 
surveillance"); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418,426 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding "that the President 
may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence"). 
166 Miller v. Nat' I Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (1986) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS§ 652B (1976)). 
167 Linda Ross Meyer, Unruly Rights, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. I, 35 (2000); see also Shulman v. 
Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998) ("We agree ... that all the circumstances of an 
intrusion, including the motives or justification of the intruder are pertinent to the offensiveness 
element. Motivation or justification becomes particularly important when the intrusion is by a member 
of the print or broadcast press in the pursuit of news material."). 
168 See, e.g., Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the use of a 
hidden video camera in a bedroom by an estranged wife was a privacy violation); Geraci v. Conte, No. 
72440, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2727, at **3, 6-8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1998) (holding installation 
of one-way mirror an invasion of privacy). 
169 See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman 206 A.2d 239, 241-42 (N.H. 1964) (holding that listening 
device implanted in wall of marital bedroom was an invasion of privacy). 
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mail, 170 a jury can clearly find the intrusion offensive. 
Alternatively, where one invades the privacy of another for a 
legitimate purpose, such as the protection of another or the 
prevention of unlawful behavior, an intrusion may not be 
offensive. Thus, where a former husband takes pictures of his ex-
wife's lesbian lover in the nude in order to document the risk to his 
daughter who is living with the couple, there is no invasion of 
privacy. 171 Or where a landowner is concerned that his neighbor is 
improperly disposing of hazardous waste, and he employs a 
camera, binoculars and a high-powered telescope, there is no 
offensive intrusion. 172 Under this standard, a federal district court 
would be at quite a loss trying to determine whether, under state 
tort law, the government's interest in national security was 
significant enough to offset the intrusive nature of the e-mail 
interception. While it is clear that protection of others is a 
legitimate reason to invade another's privacy, a nationwide e-mail 
intercept program bears little resemblance to neighbors wielding 
binoculars and cameras. A federal court can do little more than 
simply guess how state law would address a case of such national 
concern. 
The point of these examples is not to demonstrate that tort law will fail 
to sanction misbehavior by government officials. It is certainly possible 
that state law could render the government official liable in tort in any of 
the examples above. Rather, the point here is that tort law-having 
evolved for hundreds of years to address the interactions between private 
persons-is unlikely to contain clear answers when called on to regulate 
the interactions between the government and private persons. 
It is important here to clarify the scope of this argument against the use 
of state remedies. I have demonstrated that state remedies should be 
ignored because a court hearing a constitutional tort action will never be 
able to know with any certainty whether state law will in fact provide a 
remedy. One might point out that, because the provision of a remedy will 
ultimately fall to a jury and its assessment of the evidence, it will always 
170 See, e.g., Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that opening of 
another's mail without permission was an intrusion upon seclusion). 
171 Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1039-40 (Miss. 1999) (explaining that the ex-husband's 
invasion was justified because he sought to secure the "welfare of his daughter"). 
172 N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 730-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); see also 
Parish v. Nat') Bank v. C.E. Lane, 397 So. 2d 1282, 1286--87 (La. 1981) (holding that bank's intrusion 
into debtor's property to appraise it was justified considering the bank's financial interest); Saldana v. 
Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 383-84 (Mich Ct. App. 1989) (holding that use of a 1200 
millimeter telephoto lens to record one's movements was not an invasion of privacy because the 
defendant "had a legitimate right to investigate" whether the plaintiff's claimed injuries were actual); 
PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. 895 P.2d 1269, 1280-81 (Nev. 1995) (holding that the use of a hidden 
camera to record animal abuses did not invade any privacy interests). 
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be impossible-regardless of the applicable legal regime-to determine 
whether relief will issue. This misses an important distinction, however. I 
do not argue that a court must ignore state law because it can never know 
the results of a jury trial applying tort law, but because a court can never 
adequately know the content of state law itself. A court entertaining a 
constitutional tort action must always assume that the allegations in the 
complaint are true. If those allegations state a violation of the U.S. 
Constitution, a court should not dismiss the suit unless it can be sure that 
those same allegations also state a violation of state tort law. Because the 
content of state tort law as applied to alleged unconstitutional behavior will 
often be vague, a court will rarely know this. As such, it should ignore 
state remedies in constitutional tort actions. 
B. Procedural Challenges to Ascertaining the Content of State Law 
Even if a particularly talented jurist was up to tackling complicated 
questions about whether an officer's intentional pat down was intentionally 
offensive, the task will only be made more difficult (if not impossible) by 
the stage in the suit at which such questions will most likely arise. In a 
typical Bivens suit, for example, a court will most likely be called on to 
determine the existence of alternative state remedies when moved by the 
defendant to dismiss the case. 173 Motions to dismiss, of course, are filed 
long before any discovery has taken place. Thus, in assessing whether a 
remedy is available in practice under state law, courts will be limited to the 
pleadings. 
Of course, these pleadings will be styled with an eye towards a federal, 
rather than a state, cause of action. They are thus unlikely to contain any 
allegation that the government officer, for example, intended his touching 
to be offensive. Although courts have the well-established prerogative to 
"look behind" the pleadings in resolving motions to dismiss, 174 there is 
little precedent for the type of searching inquiry necessitated by inquiring 
into the availability of state remedies. The only option for the court at this 
point, one presumes, is to solicit affidavits or live testimony from the 
parties. Of course, the parties have not had any opportunity for discovery 
173 See, e.g., Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090 (lOth Cir 2005) (deciding state remedy 
question upon defendant's motion to dismiss), rev'd in part, 449 F.3d 1097 (lOth Cir. 2006). 
174 See Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993) ("A 
plaintiff is under no obligation to attach to her complaint documents upon which her action is based, 
but a defendant may introduce certain pertinent documents if the plaintiff failed to do so."); Fudge v. 
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that "not every document referred to 
in a complaint may be considered incorporated by reference[,]" although documents may be considered 
when there is no prejudice to the opposing party); Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 949 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(stating that the court may consider other information when a failure to submit the material "does not 
constitute actionable nondisclosure"); 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1327, at 438--39 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleader may "attach a 
copy of the writing on which his claim for relief or defense is based"). 
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and thus are unlikely to be able to allege facts sufficient to make out a 
prima facie tort claim. The court could perhaps avoid this by holding the 
motion to dismiss in abeyance until discovery could be completed. The 
burdens of this would be excessive, however. The court would be called 
on to hold a mini trial or resolve de facto summary judgment motions on a 
purely legal issue-whether a federal cause of action exists. Moreover, 
this would create perverse incentives for the parties. The plaintiff, to 
maintain her constitutional tort action, would be called on to marshal 
evidence that, for example, the officer did not intend his touching to be 
offensive and the defendant would be called upon to marshal evidence that 
he intended his touching to be offensive. One doubts whether the parties 
will be willing to provide such evidence, thus depriving the judge of 
information sufficient to rule on the existence of alternative state remedies. 
To make matters worse, consider the situation where the district court 
mistakenly concludes that a state remedy exists, and thus inappropriately 
dismisses the suit. The plaintiff then files a suit under state tort law, only 
to be informed by the next judge that no such cause of action exists. 
Having realized only now that the first court erred, the plaintiff is out of 
time to file an appeal in the first case. This Catch-22 can only be avoided 
if the first court dismisses the suit without prejudice. Of course, if the 
court were to do this as a matter of practice, litigants would be free to re-
file their Bivens actions over and over again. 175 While this is not a 
common practice with most litigants, inmates have been known to pepper 
the legal system with more than their fair share of lawsuits. 176 
Yet, the situation can become even more absurd than this. Take for 
example the following case: 
Freedom of Speech. Suppose the president of an influential 
company that manufactures mail-sorting technology publicly 
criticizes the U.S. Postal Service for its poor technology choices. 
Insulted by the comments, several Postal officers seek to punish 
the president by accusing him of involvement in an illegal 
kickback scheme and later instigating criminal charges against 
him. Although a grand jury indicted the president based on 
scattered evidence, a federal court, after a six-week trial, acquitted 
him of all charges. While the actions of postal officers and the 
federal prosecutor violate the First Amendment speech clause, 177 it 
175 See Hawkins v. McHugh, 46 F.3d 10, 12 (5th Cir. 1995) ("A federal court that dismisses 
without prejudice a suit arising from a federal statutory cause of action has not adjudicated the suit on 
its merits, and leaves the parties in the same legal position as if no suit had been filed."). 
176 Indeed, Congress considered this such a problem that it attempted to curtail such suits through 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000). 
177 See Hartman v. Moore, 126 S. Ct. 1695, 1701 (2006) ("[T]he law is settled that as a general 
matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory 
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is unclear whether a state tort remedy exists. While many states 
recognize malicious prosecution suits, plaintiffs must typically 
demonstrate the absence of probable cause in the underlying 
action. 178 Thus, to determine whether an alternative state remedy 
existed, the court must determine whether probable cause existed 
in this case. That in tum would require the court to reassess the 
grand jury's decision, a task that can only be completed upon a 
complete review of the physical and oral evidence. 179 
One immediately wonders how a court is to undertake that task. Is the 
court to call a hearing in which all the witnesses who testified before the 
grand jury will testify again before the court? Such would result in a mini-
trial on the facts-all for the purpose of determining a purely legal issue, 
whether a cause of action exists. This is a confounding situation for both 
the judge and parties and is patently unworkable. 
C. Deleterious Effects of Attempting to Ascertain State Law 
Despite the difficulties determining whether state remedies exist for 
allegations in the plaintiffs, the mere attempt of ascertaining state 
remedies may have unfortunate consequences for state law. Judges and 
scholars have long recognized the risk that ensues anytime the courts of 
one sovereign interpret the laws of another sovereign. The risk has been 
particularly acute ever since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which held 
that federal courts hearing state law claims must apply both the statutory 
and common law of the state whose law controls the case. 180 After Erie, 
federal courts hearing a state law tort suit, for example, are called on to 
search state court opinions (rather than just the state statutes) for the 
applicable law. 181 In many instances, the reporters contain clear answers. 
Landowners have no duty towards unforeseeable trespassers, but do have a 
duty to warn licensees and invitees of non-obvious dangers. 182 
Occasionally, however, a particular case presents an issue that the state 
supreme court has not yet decided. In those cases, federal courts are called 
on to engage in a delicate act of prediction. They "must forecast the 
position the supreme court of the forum would take on the issue."183 This 
actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.") (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 
574, 592 (I 998)). 
178 DOBBS, supra note 147, § 430, at 1215. 
179 The facts of this case are adopted from those in Hartman, 126 S. Ct. at 1699. 
180 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
181 !d. 
182 See, e.g., Micromano1is v. Woods Sch., Inc., 989 F.2d 696, 698 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that 
"[u]nder Pennsylvania law, '[t]he standard of care a possessor of land owes to one who enters upon the 
land depends upon whether the person entering is a trespassor [sic], licensee, or invitee"') (quoting 
Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (1983)). 
183 Clark v. Modem Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321,326 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 
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is no easy task and federal courts undoubtedly get it wrong in many 
instances. 184 Thus, as many scholars have noted, such intetjurisdictional 
interpretations have "the potential to create a variety of problems, from the 
minor to the chaotic."185 
Thus, assessing the availability of state remedies in constitutional tort 
actions, inasmuch as it invites federal rulings in areas of unsettled state 
law, may have deleterious effects on state law and, more broadly, federal-
state relations. While some issues of state law will undoubtedly be clear to 
federal courts, two factors suggest that federal courts will encounter an 
uncommon number of unsettled state law questions in this area. First, as 
recognized in the several examples above, many acts by federal officials 
will appear wrongful in some general sense but not necessarily fit neatly 
into a state law cause of action. 186 Federal courts will repeatedly be called 
on to venture into uncharted waters, searching for a state cause of action 
Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Where the substantive law of the forum state is 
uncertain or ambiguous, the job of the federal courts is carefully to predict how the highest court of the 
forum state would resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity."); Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 186 
(7th Cir. 1991) (noting that federal courts sitting in diversity "must strive to parse state law and, if 
necessary, forecast its path of evolution"). 
184 Mistakes of this sort are sometimes avoided by using state certification statutes, which roughly 
mimic the principle (though not procedure) established in R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941). See 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4248, at 482-483 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining that most states now have certification 
statutes allowing their courts to answer certified questions). Using this tool, federal courts are 
permitted to certify novel state law questions to state high courts. Although certification is rather 
commonplace today, many call for its increased usage. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 77 (1997) (chiding lower courts for failing to employ certification often enough). 
In Part IV, infra, I consider whether certification might ameliorate the state remedy rule's deleterious 
effect on state law. There, I express doubt as to the usefulness of the procedure. 
185 Friedman, supra note 48, at 1238; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of 
Federal Courts to CertifY Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1672, 1674 & n.3 (2003) 
(listing instances where federal courts have erroneously interpreted state law and noting the sometimes 
long delay before such interpretations are rectified by state courts); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal 
Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1677-79 
(1992) (explaining the effects of diversity jurisdiction on state law). Indeed, one commentator has 
argued that such "predicative" adjudication is unconstitutional. See generally Bradford R. Clark, 
Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1459 (1997). 
It is true that some scholars have found inteljurisdictional decisions to have salutary effects on 
state and federal law. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and 
State Power, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1505-{)6 n.116 (discussing the usefulness of having multiple 
interpreters of federal law); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the 
Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1409, 1467 (1999) (noting that ''territorial or systemic boundaries 
need not disqualify a court from making a valuable contribution to the ongoing interpretive exercise"); 
David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 325 
(1977) (performing empirical study of federal diversity cases and noting federal contribution to 
development of state law). While there is certainly some truth to this, it is doubtful whether the odd 
questions of law posed by the above hypotheticals are ripe for development by the federal courts. 
Indeed, if the values of federal interpretation of state law include "reconciling or distinguishing existing 
precedent, [or] synthesizing and analyzing state law," it seems doubtful that there will be any relevant 
precedent to reconcile, distinguish, synthesize or analyze. !d. at 325-26. 
186 See supra notes 131-65 and accompanying text. 
760 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:723 
into which they can shoehorn a constitutional claim. Of course, the federal 
courts might decline to find such a cause of action unless it was clearly 
established. But there is reason-and this is the second point-to think 
this may not happen in Bivens cases. The Supreme Court has strongly 
admonished courts to exercise "caution toward extending Bivens remedies 
into any new context."187 Indeed, in the Peoples case discussed earlier, the 
Tenth Circuit specifically cited this "caution" as a type of "tie-breaker" 
suggesting that the Bivens action should not be implied.188 As the court 
explained, "[ w ]bile there certainly are points to be made that would favor 
implying a Bivens claim in such a scenario, we are reminded that the 
'caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a caution 
consistently and repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses such 
an extension here. "'189 Thus, under the state remedy rule, lower federal 
courts will face a significant number of cases having an uncommon risk of 
disrupting state law and, instead of backing away from such a risk, will 
feel a duty to convert-and perhaps contort---constitutional claims into 
state law causes of action. 
D. Bivens-based Reasons to Ignore State Remedies 
Thus far I have presented arguments for ignoring state remedies in 
both Bivens and Section 1983 actions. In this Part, I offer two additional 
reasons, unique to Bivens suits, to ignore state remedies. As explained 
below, the reliance on state remedies in Bivens actions completely 
misapprehends the reason why "alternative remedies" have sometimes 
been relevant in Bivens actions. Additionally, relying on state remedies, 
when done in tandem with mandatory provisions of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, squarely contradicts Carlson v. Green-a case that is 
indispensable to the Court's current Bivens jurisprudence. 
1. Alternative Remedies 
At the inception of the Bivens doctrine, the Supreme Court crafted a 
rule to accommodate two competing principles. One principle-which has 
been termed the "very essence of civil liberty,"-recognizes "the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives 
an injury."190 In implying a damages remedy directly under the 
Constitution, however, the Court necessarily addressed a second, 
competing principle: separation of powers. Because Congress clearly has 
187 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (refusing to extend the holding of 
Bivens). 
188 Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1103 (lOth Cir. 2005) (quoting Malesko, 543 U.S. 
at 74). 
189 !d. 
190 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) 
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1 Cranch 137) (1803)). 
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the authority to sanction a damages action against federal officers (and has 
done just that with respect to state officers191), the Supreme Court tread 
carefully in implying a remedy. Thus, to respect the prerogatives of 
Congress without unduly withholding remedies from the injured, the Court 
refused to imply a damages action where, as stated in Carlson v. Green, 
"special factors counsel[] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress," or where "Congress has provided an alternative remedy."192 
Thus, the alternative remedy rule was born. Since creating the Bivens 
action, the Supreme Court has refused to imply a damages remedy due to 
alternative remedies only three times. In Bush v. Lucas, a federal 
employee sued his superior for a violation of his First Amendment 
rights. 193 The Court refused to imply a damages action, however, because 
"comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions" passed by 
Congress gave the plaintiff "meaningful remedies."194 Similarly, in 
Schweiker v. Chi/icky, the Court barred a plaintiff from pursuing social 
security benefits in a Bivens action because Congress has addressed the 
problems alleged by the plaintiff through the creation of wide-ranging 
administrative remedies. 195 Finally, in Correctional Services Corp. v. 
Malesko, the Court again held that Bivens actions should only be implied 
where a "plaintiff ... lack[s] any alternative remedy."196 In the Court's 
view, the Malesko plaintiff-a prisoner alleging Eighth Amendment 
violations--could seek relief via the federal Bureau of Prisons' 
"Administrative Remedy Program" or bring a tort suit under state law. 197 
Looking at these three cases, one can easily see the place where the 
alternative remedy rule ran off track. While the alternative remedies in 
Bush and Schweiker were federal, Malesko introduced state remedies as a 
viable alternative. Malesko was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who 
had long been hostile to Bivens in general. 198 Thus, one might read the 
opinion as an attempt to curtail the overall availability of Bivens actions. 
Whatever one makes of this goal, it is undeniable that the methods 
employed to accomplish this have no basis within the Bivens doctrine. The 
purpose of inquiring into "alternative remedies" is to pay heed to 
191 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2000). 
192 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). 
193 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,368-69 (1983). 
194 /d. at 368. 
195 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,424-25,429 (1988). 
196 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
197 /d. at 73-74. 
198 Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist authored another opinion making an unprecedented, and 
in the minds of some, unjustified use of state remedies. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. 
v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643-45 (1999) (holding that the unconstitutionality of patent 
infringement by a state government turned in part on the "availability of state remedies"); see also 
Wells, supra note 124, at 1667 (arguing that, "in awarding constitutional status to state remedies, 
Florida Prepaid seems to depart significantly from established law, for the rule has been that the 
Constitution is violated when the state official acts, no matter what state remedies may be available"). 
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separation of powers principles, which properly recognize that Congress 
has the authority to create its own remedial schemes. State prerogatives 
have no place in Bivens suits, or the behavior giving rise to them. Such 
suits measure the actions of federal officers against the federal 
constitution, and are almost always litigated in federal court. 199 
2. Carlson v. Green 
Even if one could elide those doctrinal considerations, however, it is be 
impossible to ignore the conflict with Carlson v. Green created by the 
reliance on state remedies.200 The conflict arises from the operation of the 
Westfall Act, addressed earlier.201 Recall that, under the Westfall Act, tort 
actions against federal officers are recast as suits against the federal 
government itself. 202 Thus, if a plaintiff files a Bivens action that is 
dismissed because state remedies exist, and the plaintiff then re-alleges her 
claims against the federal officer in tort, her suit would be converted into a 
tort action against the United States under the FTCA. In sum, therefore, 
the state remedy rule holds that FTCA actions against the federal 
government are sufficient alternatives displacing the Bivens action. 
This is problematic because, in Carlson v. Green, the Supreme Court 
held that a FTCA suit was not a sufficient alternative to a Bivens suit.203 
The Court offered two reasons why it was not an alternative: (1) it was 
against the United States rather than against the individual federal officer, 
and (2) it did not provide access to punitive damages and a jury trial.204 To 
be sure, and as noted earlier,205 the Court has retreated a bit from its 
language in Carlson. A suit in which punitive damages are unavailable or 
capped, although perhaps not equally effective as Bivens remedies, may 
still provide meaningful relief?06 Meaningful relief from an alternative 
source makes the Bivens action unnecessary.207 Despite the Court's retreat 
on this issue, however, it has steadfastly held true to its belief that claims 
against organizations-rather than against individual members of those 
199 Although state courts are obligated to hear federal questions brought before them, see Testa v. 
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947), Bivens suits are rarely filed in state courts. Even when they are, federal 
defendants almost uniformly remove the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2000) (establishing that a civil action against a federal officer commenced in 
state court may be removed to federal court). 
200 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23-24 (1980). 
201 See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text. 
203 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23. 
204 !d. at 21-22. 
205 See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text. 
206 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (holding that ''remedies [that] do not provide 
complete relief for the plaintiff' may still be alternative remedies that displace the Bivens cause of 
action). 
207 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) ("And, of course, were Congress to create 
equally effective alternative remedies, the need for damages relief might be obviated.") (citation 
omitted). 
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organizations-do not have a deterrent effect on individual conduct and 
therefore should not give rise to Bivens suits.208 
For instance, in FDIC v. Meyer, the Court considered whether a Bivens 
action should be implied for claims against federal agencies.209 Declining 
to imply a cause of action in such cases, the Court explained that if it 
"impl[ied] a damages action directly against federal agencies ... there 
would be no reason . . . to bring damages actions against individual 
officers. . . . [T]he deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be 
lost."210 In a more recent case, Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, the 
Court considered whether a Bivens action should be implied for a claim 
against a private prison corporation hired by the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
to house federal inmates.211 Although the alleged harm was committed by 
an employee of the prison, the plaintiff brought suit against the prison 
corporation using a respondeat superior theory of liability. Holding closely 
to Meyer, the Supreme Court again declined to imply a Bivens action.212 
"For if a corporate defendant is available for suit," the Court explained, 
"claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual 
directly responsible for the alleged injury."213 Accordingly, because the 
"threat of suit against an individual's employer was not the kind of 
deterrence contemplated by Bivens," a cause of action should not be 
implied.214 
Thus, the theory first advanced in Carlson-that suits against the 
United States are insufficient alternatives to Bivens actions because any 
deterrent effect would be weak or inoperative-is still alive and strong in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Yet, the emerging reliance on state 
remedies, when taken together with the Westfall Act, holds that suits 
against the federal government under the FTCA are sufficient alternative 
remedies. This position is untenable. A plaintiff would be denied access 
to a Bivens action because she has sufficient alternative remedies, except 
that the alternative remedies she has are the exact remedies the Supreme 
Court has thrice determined to be insufficient. 
Finally, lest it be argued that overruling Carlson is a viable way out of 
this mess, one should bear in mind that Carlson played an important role in 
208 Some scholars take issue with this conception of deterrence. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Why 
Bivens Won't Die: The Legacy of Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 83 DENY. U. L. REv. 685, 692 
n.62 (2006) (explaining that the argument "runs contrary to the fundamental tort principle of respondeat 
superior, as well as common sense"). 
209 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,473 (1994). 
210 !d. at 485. 
211 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001). Correctional Services Corporation 
qualified as a federal actor because of its contractual relationship with the federal government. !d. 
Thus, while the plaintiff's suit failed for other reasons, there was no "state action" problem with his 
claims. 
212 !d. at 71. 
213 !d. (citation omitted). 
214 Jd. at 70 (citation omitted). 
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other key Bivens cases. In both Meyer and Malesko, the majority relied on 
Carlson to deny the cause of action to plaintiffs suing organizations.215 
Were Carlson's original holding that individual actors are not deterred by 
assessing damages against the individual's organization to be overruled, 
both Meyer and Malesko would be severely undercut.216 If limiting the 
Bivens remedy is a goal of some, then overruling Carlson and formally 
adopting the state remedy rule is a bad idea. It would only expand the 
Bivens remedy. Thus, whether one sides with the majority or minority in 
Carlson, Meyer, and Malesko, Carlson has to stay and the reliance on state 
remedies has to go. 
* * * 
In sum, relying on the availability of state remedies in constitutional 
tort actions is unwise not because state courts or state law will be hostile to 
federal rights, but because it will rarely be clear whether state law will ever 
provide relief for alleged unconstitutional behavior. A complaint alleging 
a facially valid constitutional tort should not be dismissed merely upon the 
possibility that the complaint presents a claim under state law. Since the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and related statutes, federal rights 
have been regarded as primary and not contingent upon whether state law 
also provides relief. Though the reasons for this may be different today 
than before, the rule remains justified. 
VI. THE PROBLEMS WITH CERTIFICATION 
In light of the foregoing problems with the state remedy rule, the way 
forward is relatively clear; federal courts should not attempt to opine on the 
merits of state tort law in constitutional tort actions. In this Part, I explain 
and dismiss one potentially viable alternative: certification. 
After Erie, federal courts were increasingly presented with unclear or 
novel questions of state law. In these situations, federal courts did their 
best to "predict" how the state supreme court would answer the question. 
Of course, as noted above, this effort at prediction carries the inherent risk 
that the federal court will answer the question incorrectly.217 Within a 
decade after Erie, the prospect of partnering with state courts in diversity 
actions developed. 218 Yet it was not until the 1970s that certification 
statutes spread nationwide.219 Now nearly every state in the union 
currently empowers their highest court to resolve questions of state law 
215 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485; Ma/esko, 534 U.S. at 67--68. 
216 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 473-74; Malesko, 543 U.S. at 70. 
211 See supra notes 170--73 and accompanying text. 
218 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 139, § 4248 (providing a history of certification). 
219 !d. § 4248 at 489-90. 
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before federal courts.Z20 The procedure has gained wide acceptance, such 
that some claim that one solution to the friction between state and federal 
courts is to "certify, certify, certify."221 
Under the typical certification statute, a state's highest court may 
resolve a question of state law presented in a federal suit "if the answer 
may be determinative of an issue pending in the [federal] litigation ... and 
there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or 
statute of this State."222 Empowering the high court of a state to resolve 
these questions is thought to have two main benefits. For one, the 
procedure is thought to be "uniquely suited to further the principles of 
judicial federalism underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Erie."223 In 
this way, it prevents federal courts from "sullying the integrity of state 
law."224 For another, certification is thought to "save time, energy, and 
resources.'m5 Of course, this benefit seems to accrue mainly to the federal 
judiciary since certification clearly increases the workload of state high 
courts. Moreover, the alleged time savings are relative; certification is a 
speedier process than its more cumbersome cousin, Pullman abstention/26 
but it still slows the disposition of a case, sometimes dramatically.227 This 
is likely why federal judges, despite their appreciation for federal-state 
comity,228 often decline to certify state questions to state courts.229 
At first glance, certification might seem to be a perfect solution to the 
problem created by relying on state remedies. After all, "[s]tate courts 
enjoy the benefit of having the final say on matters of state law" and 
"[f]ederal courts are able to avoid the awkward, tenuous, and difficult 
chore of attempting to determine how a state high court would rule on a 
220 !d. § 4248 at 495 n.30 (listing current certification statutes). 
221 Calabresi, supra note Ill, at 1301; see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 
U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997) (urging certification in any case involving "unsettled state Jaw issues"). 
222 Unif. Certification of Questions of Law (Act) (Rule) 1995 § 3, 12 U.L.A. 74 (1996). 
223 Clark, supra note 185, at 1550. 
224 Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question ... , 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677, 
683 (1995). 
225 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,390-91 (1974). 
226 See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (referring cases to state trial 
courts for resolution of state law issue where question of state law is antecedent to question of federal 
constitutional law). 
227 See Kansallis Fin. Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731, 732 (Mass. 1996) (fourteen months before 
certified question answered); Computer Assocs. lnt'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 61 F.3d 6, 7 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(fourteen months); Savona v. Prudential ins. Co., 51 F.3d 241, 241 (lith Cir. 1995) (two years); 
Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 604 (9th Cir. 1993) (seventeen months); Cuesnongle 
v. Ramos, 835 F.2d 1486, 1490-93 (1st Cir. 1987) (between two and three years); Toner v. Lederle 
Labs., 828 F.2d 510, 511 (9th Cir. 1987) (thirteen months); Wood v. City of E. Providence, 81 I F.2d 
677,678 (1st Cir. 1987)(six years). 
228 See JONA GoLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 
66 (I 995) (stating that, based on a survey by the American Judicature Society and the State Justice 
Institute, "[a]lmost all of the circuit judges (93%), district judges (86%), and state justices (87%) agree 
that certification improves federal-state comity"). 
229 See id. at 54 (stating that delay is the most common point of federal judge's dissatisfaction 
with certification). 
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matter of state law."230 While it is true that certification offers these 
benefits, it is far from certain that the state law questions presented in 
constitutional tort actions will be amenable to certification. For one, 
certification is impossible without a well-developed factual record. 
Indeed, "many receiving courts simply will not answer the questions 
presented in the absence of resolved or stipulated facts."231 As explained 
above, however, it is unlikely that the factual record will be developed at 
the time when a dispute arises as to the content of state law.232 While the 
dispute might be put off until the facts can be developed through 
discovery, the parties will find themselves in an awkward position. 
Moreover, even if a question of state law could be supported by a 
factual predicate sufficient for a state court to answer a certified question, 
it is dubious that state courts will appreciate the "benefit of having the final 
say on matters of state law" in such cases.233 For example, it is one thing 
to ask a state court to opine on whether damages for pure emotional 
distress are available, but it is another to ask that court whether a prison 
may be held liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Many certified questions are unlikely to have even the slightest precedent 
in state law because, like the examples offered above, they have long been 
resolved under constitutional, rather than state, law.234 These questions are 
likely to confound state courts and force them to engage in various 
doctrinal contortions. Indeed, state courts may come to feel that they, 
rather than the federal government, are being drafted into a civil rights 
enforcement regime that was previously assumed almost solely by the 
federal courts. Though the states certainly share a duty to enforce civil 
rights, shifting this duty to the state courts through certification is hardly 
the picture of state-federal comity for which certification is touted. 
Finally, even if federal courts are able to certify state law questions 
adequately, and state courts willingly resolve them, one must still question 
whether the ultimate cost is worth the procedural burden. With regard to 
Bivens actions at least, using certification is merely to throw good 
federalism after bad. It is good federalism to offer state courts a chance to 
opine on matters of state law, but the need for such comity only arises 
because bad federalism is being practicing elsewhere in the doctrinal 
framework. There is no federalist justification for relying on state 
remedies in a damages action against a federal officer predicated on a 
federal constitutional violation. State interests are wholly absent. Only 
where the state interest is manufactured (by relying on state remedies in the 
230 Nash, supra note 185, at 1674. 
231 Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18 
J. LEGIS. 127, 153 (1992). 
232 See text accompanying notes 173-78. 
233 Nash, supra note 185, at 1674. 
234 See text accompanying notes 146-72. 
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first place) does the need for certification arise. The solution, therefore, is 
not certification, but rejecting state remedies in the first place. With regard 
to Section 1983 actions, it is dubious that state interests are significantly 
furthered through certification in these situations. While the procedure 
grants state courts a role in regulating the conduct of state officers, it 
certainly does not relieve states of their preexisting duty to impose federal 
constitutional constraints on state officers. State courts, through their 
criminal and habeas dockets, routinely apply federal civil rights laws 
against their own officers. Similarly, federal courts, through their habeas 
docket, routinely review state officer behavior for compliance with federal 
constitutional requirements. 235 Thus, using certification in Section 1983 
suits will not insulate states from intrusive federal laws and adjudication. 
Certification or not, such "intrusions" will persist and the marginal value of 
certification in thus vanishingly small in Section 1983 suits. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the field of constitutional torts, there has long raged a debate about 
whether such actions should be seen as constitutional torts or constitutional 
torts. While there are arguments to be made in favor of both positions, 
there is little argument to be made for the use of tort law itself in 
constitutional tort actions. Ignoring state tort remedies, while perhaps 
originally justified due to the hostility of state courts and state law, remains 
justified because, short of entirely separate adjudication, it will never be 
clear whether tort law will indeed provide relief. Certification cannot 
likely mollify this problem without simultaneously imposing unnecessary 
costs. State tort remedies should therefore be irrelevant to constitutional 
tort actions in the future. 
2lS 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (2000). 
